WARHEAD TO FOREHEAD: MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS
1. Multi-domain operations (MDO) is supposedly the new panacea for all maladies that ail the Indian Armed Forces and would reinvigorate its capabilities to achieve decisive edge in a conflict with a near peer adversary. It’s the most quoted phrase of the military lexicon in the last few years. Fulcrum of the Integrated Theatre Commands is this idea of MDO. However, if we go through the doctrinal articulation of MDO in the Indian Armed Forces available on open source, one would draw a blank. The closest we get to this concept is the Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) of 2018[1] which refers to this concept twice in the entire document at page 2[2] and page 7[3].
2. In absence of any official articulation, better understanding of what we intend to achieve is left to the vision of each individual or his interpretation of available material on internet which would invariably gravitate to US Armed Forces publications. According to the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC): “Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) describes how the U.S. Army, as part of the joint force [Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Space Force] can counter and defeat a near-peer adversary capable of contesting the U.S. in all domains [air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace] in both competition and armed conflict. The concept describes how U.S. ground forces, as part of the joint and multinational team, deter adversaries and defeat highly capable near-peer enemies in the 2025–2050 timeframe.”[4] In layman’s language, it means, MDO is a way to provide effects with timing and tempo that the enemy cannot compete with.
3. One may ask, how is MDO any different than fighting together as a Integrated Force? In the past, ops were single-domain focused, with coordinated effects, and archaic command and control (C2) processes. Operations today are layered or synchronized but not fully integrated. The authorities for space/cyber forces are retained largely at the strategic or national level while authorities for air operations remain at the operational level. Situational awareness capabilities are not designed to provide an integrated understanding of the battle space that spans all domains, and C2 constructs do not provide the necessary agility to synchronize effects. Integrated Theatre Commands hopefully are looking at how we make decisions at pace and scale needed with a peer competitor, how to create a common operating picture that will connect the right sensor to the right processor, and ultimately to the right shooter. It should also be working to ensure that the right systems and people are in place for multi-domain C2 and distributed C2.
4. Now that we have arrived at the need for MDO, we need to look at the domains to set a foundation for where operations are taking place. The traditional domains are air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace. Definition of domain is “critical macro manoeuvre space whose access or control is vital to the freedom of action and superiority required by the mission.”[5] Cognitive domain should now be considered as the sixth domain, as it is becoming increasingly more important with the introduction of space and cyber technologies. The domain has opened up the populace to more information, making the traditional gatekeepers inadequate and making it easier for any actor, state or non-state, to make effects in any domain. The traditional gatekeepers are being outpaced at sharing information by entities such as Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms. A good example of how the cognitive domain is increasingly becoming a more critical domain can be seen in the book, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. The author, David Patrikarakos, describes how Twitter is now the main source of vital, timely information in the Russia-Ukrainian conflict. He is a reporter on the frontlines of the conflict and consistently gets his most up-to-date information from users via Twitter. There are pros and cons when it comes to this kind of speed of information. Patrikarakos writes about “witnessing, re-invention of reality. And social media was at its heart.”[6] Patrikarakos said, “I began to understand that I was caught up in two wars: one fought on the ground with tanks and artillery, and an information war fought largely, though not exclusively, through social media. And perhaps counterintuitively, it mattered more who won the war of words and narrative than who had the most potent weaponry. Something we have already experienced in last few years both on our Western and Northern Borders, with Pakistan’s stated doctrinal construct of ‘Notion of Victory’[7] a classic manifestation of victory in the mind space.
5. Achieving cognitive superiority requires more than enhancing the cognitive capacities of our armed forces. It requires military leaders and civilian elites with the cognitive complexity, intellectual curiosity, political will and courage to understand the national security implications of the cognitive domain. It requires understanding the importance of credibility and legitimacy in communicating to the public and across governmental institutions to coordinate all elements of national power in protecting and retaining strategic advantage. We are presently focussing on achieving cognitive superiority through technology infusion and augmentation which juxtaposes into being able to gather, decipher, process and understand tremendous quantum of data and information faster than the enemy. Fusing this capability with cloud computing, robotics, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality, augments the decision-making process, multi-domain operations, and the learning and adaptability of military organizations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Communicating this knowledge internally and externally faster than a competitor is imperative. It provides the ability to get inside an enemy’s decision-cycle; influence their perceived reality; and impose our will.
6. Clauswitz’ coup d’oeil[8] will always play a role in warfare (my blog on the subject), the ability to see things simply and innately is challenged as information, disinformation, and both true and false knowledge grow at exponential rates. Technological capabilities can augment our capacity to decipher fact from opinion, truth from falsehood and science from conjecture. This faculty also relies on how we educate future generations that will serve in the military. Achieving cognitive superiority is directly impacted by our policy related to military education. Cognitive limitations come with being human. The ability to think rationally is limited or bounded. An example of bounded rationality is in how individuals instinctively use mental short-cuts to make decisions. Our emotions, belief systems, culture, education and experience “assist” us in filtering the overwhelming information to which we are exposed. We filter information to create and reinforce perceptions of reality that conform to our values and beliefs. Understanding science and possessing the ability to think critically, eg, can counter against deception by our enemies, misinformation campaigns by bad actors and distractions by charlatans that prey on ignorance and superstition. Educated, informed, critical thinking improves our ability to discern between true and false knowledge. Achieving this objective requires investment in our educators and commitment to life-long learning — from womb to tomb. An educated military is critical at an individual level, as well as at an organizational level.
7. The framework in Figure-1 below has been created to help identify what vectors of military power can interact in various domains and thereby affect vectors of national power to achieve the much desired cross domain domination. A commander or planner could look at this framework with an offensive posture in mind and ask how we can make effects in the various junction points. In this manner, we could throw multiple dilemmas at the enemy in various domains, slowing their decision-making process. Using a simple framework such as Figure-1 can help planners get out of their stovepipes and consider all the potential targets through various means of attack. Growing up in a certain career field or service tends to put one in a certain frame of mind, but going through this framework will open up the options to commanders and planners and enhance their cognitive capabilities.
Fig-1: MDO Cuboid[9]
8. Junction Points on this cuboid, where cognitive domain can be effected by actions of either of the three services and have implications on the vectors of national powers provides operational and strategic planners with a framework for aligning the various Lines of Operations (LsOO) to achieve cross domain deterrence and dominance. The deployment of S-400 by Indian Armed Forces is a case in point and has generated effects in all domains impacting all vectors of national power. The Indian Armed Forces must move toward the “warheads to foreheads” method of war. It is easier to put a munitions on a target than a well-coordinated information operations campaign to maximize the effects of the munitions delivery. Layering these effects is a huge win; however, commanders need to realize the full potential of their non-kinetic options as well as their kinetic options. The problem is that there is not a sufficient process in place or technology available for this type of integration and it will finally boil down to a human endeavour. The Joint Targeting and sensor shooter linkages needs to be revisited and updated to include a seamless integration of the new domains for future MDO conflicts. Understanding the current environment and how it has expanded the domains will help us to make better-informed decisions and lead us toward the right technologies to fuse together all these disparate pieces. Each domain can have a tremendous effect on the superiority of other domains, but the first step is recognizing the additional domains that are in play. Looking at a new framework to see how the domains and cross-cutting sectors interact will help identify MDO objectives to exercise for the next war. MDO requires an understanding of one’s domain and a desire to bridge the gaps to other domains to achieve dominance over the enemy’s ability to do the same. There is not a need for a substantial reorganization but instead a considerable re-education of the officer corps. Each member, especially the planners, need to expand their perspective beyond their domain. Furthermore, better tactical and operational linkages across the sectors need to exist to aid in a rapid, dynamic response to events.
9. The past paradigm of PME focused on integrating land, sea, air and space. The new paradigm must reconsider the sector approach, utilizing capabilities that provide cross-domain effects and/or provide effects across multiple domains simultaneously. The armed forces must create complex problems for the enemy while defending against the new tactics that are being demonstrated in hot spots around the world today. We must continue to explore how vulnerable and valuable the home turf is and how the battle space has enlarged to encompass our communities and agencies supporting the operations. The Indian Armed Forces can maintain superiority in the battle space by also extending the enemy’s battle space and affecting them in each of their domains. This may require restructuring or rethinking operations, but in the end, the one who mentally adapts is the one who will win the war.
[1] IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf (ssri-j.com) accessed on 21 Dec 2021.
[2] Future conflicts will be characterised by operating in a zone of ambiguity where nations are neither at peace nor at war — a ‘Grey Zone’ which makes our task more complex. Wars will be Hybrid in nature, a blend of conventional and unconventional, with the focus increasingly shifting to multi domain Warfare varying from non-contact to contact warfare.
[3] Development of capabilities will be based on a tiered, prioritised, sector specific and threat based evaluation to cater for Hybrid Threats/ Responses Short of War/ Localised Conflicts/ Multi Domain Capacities/ Out of Area Contingencies.
[4] IF11409 (congress.gov) , Congressional Research Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) updated 22 Oct 2021 accessed on 21 Dec 2021.
[5] Jeffrey Reilly, “OTH Video: Beyond the Theory — A Framework for Multi-Domain Operations,” 13 Apr 18, https://othjournal.com/.
[6] David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2017), pg 2.
[7] Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan, AVSM, VSM. An Integrated Indian Military Strategy — 2040: A Perspective (Part-I) An Integrated Indian Military Strategy — 2040: A Perspective (indiandefencereview.com) accessed on 21 Dec 21.
[8] COUP D’OEIL AND INTUITIVE DECISION MAKING | by Rommelesque | Medium accessed on 20 Dec 21.
[9] This cuboid has been generated from the lessons taught in General Staff Academy, Moscow during Military Security of the State Course and superimposed on the construct of MDO.
