THUCYDIDES; HIS TRAP AND INDIA

Some years ago one watched a movie ‘300’ and was spurred to read about conflict in ancient Europe. A mere scratch on the surface, and out came a book on Peloponnesian War by Thucydides. It chronicled the great power conflict between the Greek city states of Athens and Sparta in a war that would last almost 30 years. The war would end in Athenian defeat; but also desolation, destruction and the loss of power to all those drawn into the vortex of this epochal war. Thucydides cautioned against the use of war as a tool of policy; this ensures that his work has an enduring relevance worthy of further discussion as we stand off with China in Eastern Ladakh. Another book which resonates with ideas from the same ancient conflict but written in recent times (2017) is ‘Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?’ by Graham T Allison, Professor of Government at Harvard University who premised the narrative on a Thucydides conclusion; “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made the war inevitable.” Thucydides’s Trap is a phrase coined by him that juxtaposes historic referencing of sixteen occasions where a deadly pattern of structural stress results when a rising power challenges a ruling one. Out of the sixteen instances quoted in the book, twelve resulted in a conflict. While the book is a diplomatic treatise on how to avoid a Sino-US Conflict, the situation closer home is snowballing into a similar paradox where hyper-nationalism is choosing to ignore history and those who do are doomed to repeat it with cataclysmic effects.

Not that I am intrinsically a pacifist or willing to roll over without a fight but then some wise person had once said that one must choose his battles wisely. At the battle of Pylos, after the Athenians won a major victory over Sparta, the Spartan envoy to Athens exhorts the victors to “treat their gains as precarious,” and advised that “if great enmities are ever to be really settled, we think it will be, not by the system of revenge and military success… but when the more fortunate combatant waives his privileges and, guided by gentler feelings, conquers his rival in generosity and accords peace on more moderate conditions than expected.” Unfortunately this age old wisdom pervades the Indians and Chinese in the present context too. Transient advantages and reverses must not be considered as positions of strength or weakness in perpetuity.

Thucydides in fourth century BC had recognized that humanity has inherent flaws which will frequently lead it to war rather than peace, based on a desire for power[1] and to say the least nothing much has changed in Homo-sapiens over eons. Thucydides doesn’t explicate theories of warfare, but rather uses conflicts to elucidate on the consequences thereof in pursuit of power, something leaders on both sides of the purple line need to understand and absorb. This theme permeates the book as Thucydides attempts to show that fundamental to war’s nature is the depths that men will go to acquire, hold, and exercise power. Initial successes provided Athens great power, but they also intensified great power rivalries and created the hubris that ultimately led to its desolation. Thucydides and modern historians alike would probably suggest Athens’ fate was a result of its failure to understand the continuities of war that should have guided and constrained, rather than emboldened their actions. Each time Athens overstretched, it suffered reversals that were detrimental to their extant position. Athenian culture was, in Thucydides’ estimation, marked by spasmodic strategy-making and knee jerk impulsiveness in warfare, two factors that contributed heavily to their eventual defeat. (Rings a bell doesn’t it). While we may argue that although China has become more assertive and belligerent than before, this standoff is the consequence of President Xi’s radical foreign policy and India’s equally bellicose response to the situation which it believes is a justified blow back to the Chinese hegemony. Consequently, Xi and Modi may have started this primordial ritual of one up man ship, leading to a negative economic impact on both sides. As a matter of fact, the Sinophobic turn in New Delhi is essentially a bipartisan consensus that realistically doesn’t consider the economic facts thanks to strategic thinking or lack of it. Consider World War I, where a seemingly local event ; the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian prince in the Balkans sparked a conflagration that cost millions of lives and pitted a rising Germany against the leading power of the day, Great Britain. Under this structural stress, events in Eastern Ladakh, that might otherwise be inconsequential, or manageable, turn out to be capable of triggering a cascade of consequences, at the end of which, both countries may be at total war.

Thucydides highlights the tragedy of Athens not grabbing the opportunity for a grand peace that could benefit both powers, instead allowing war’s tendency to greater extremes pervade in the absence of the restraint of rational policy; déjà vu as it obtains in Eastern Ladakh . The outcome was a descent into a cycle of brutality and vengeance that further sullied Athenian strategic and military culture to the point where the slaughter at Melos seemed the logical extension of the abandoned intentions for Mytilene[2]. Thucydides forces us to question whether it was worth winning if the world Athens’ strategy created was overwhelmingly against them; something similar to what is happening today with Indian response in Eastern Ladakh providing other nations with a spine to stand up to Chinese hegemony and push back against the neo-imperialistic designs of the Dragon. Thucydides, therefore, remains important because this debate still shapes strategic and military culture today, with the result defining what a state has become once the war is concluded. The ancient war also has lessons for India to learn from; by failing to understand the vulnerabilities inherent in imperial overstretch the Athenians were left exposed in a two-front war with insufficient resources to satisfy either; something which we too have articulated but must avoid. Athenians found themselves reinforcing a sideshow in Sicily while the main effort in Greece remained unresolved.

The present standoff does look like the spark to the tinder of an inevitable Thucydides’ trap, but where is the solution? It is conceivable that the present standoff is just a sign that might follow more fierce disputes militarily and an impending kinetic use of force which may lead to an escalatory spiral which assumes a life and momentum of its own and difficult to control thereafter. If Professor Allison is to be believed the strategic transformation of structural forces between India and China are also doomed to conflict as are those of USA and China. It has already emerged that such a regional conflict will ineluctably reshape not only the regional but the global geopolitical landscape. Currently, India is not strong enough to compete with China in general and “the balance of power could continue to be in China’s favor for quite a long time into the future.” It is in Xi’s view still justifiable for China to suppress India’s growth right now and prevent it emerge as a competitor in the long run.

China today perceives India not as a competitor but as an adversary. Its actions are geared towards stymieing India. One-third of Chinese naval power is being deployed to the Indian Ocean Region and China’s oft repeated refrain that Indian Ocean is not India’s backyard[3] is an overreach by PLAN. It has aggressively interposed itself in India’s border disputes in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan by voicing its opposition to abrogation of Article 370; accused India of propagating the Tibetan movement, covert attacks and espionage and human rights violations; excluded India from the China-sponsored Maritime Silk Road and the Quadrilateral Dialogue with US on Afghanistan, blocked India’s NSG bid and openly supported terrorist Masood Azhar in the Security Council. PLA’s aggression since 2012 along the LAC assumed meteoric proportions with loss of lives at Galwan River on 15 June 2020. The continuing reticence to restore status quo ante and exploitation of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) vectors to contain India has become more robust and overt in recent months. The invidious actions of China are likely to result in more heartburn in Indian diplomatic circles. Beijing’s stance towards QUAD is also likely to harden and recently concluded MALABAR naval exercise will raise another red flag for China.

Effects of this standoff would be seen as far as Africa that could divide between Western, Indian and Chinese blocs. In Latin America, some other states may be open to closer relations with India to counter China’s growing neo-imperialism. Sino-Indian economic relationship which currently is geared vehemently favorably towards China, is declining sharply, slowing growth in both countries and the world economy and possibly igniting another global economic crisis amidst the blow out from COVID-19. It is very justifiable for China to want to suppress India’s growth right now and deliver a knock out blow.

Diplomacy and leadership in India and China must play pivotal roles in avoiding this dilemma. Political leaders and elites are not “simply some kind of puppet of anonymous structural forces”, but can change the historical tendency, to some extent. Leaders of both sides should be able to differentiate between the non-negotiable and negotiable national interests, thus managing the India-China rivalry. In this context, the China’s authoritarian capitalism versus the Indian socialist liberal capitalism (couldn’t help and combine the oxymoron to represent India’s conundrum), is able to compete without one devastating the other and finally let the winner prevail. The second plausible approach to this dilemma can be taken from the angle of a third party. Facing the increasingly India-China tension and the potential outbreak of a proxy war in the region, “Soft Balancing”, may be the answer that allows countries to rely on “international institutions, limited ententes” to unite and enhance their strength. Uniting countries thwarts the threatening behavior of the ruling power through economic instruments or moral and legal condemnation, thereby avoiding the Thucydides’ Trap. By comparison, the military capabilities or “Hard Balancing” of a country, remain important, but are clearly not as cost-effective as the institutionally driven “soft” method.

To summarize, both approaches are aimed at constructing the scarce asset; trust. In the anarchical international system, due to the fact there is no central authority to enforce laws, international actors, in the course of interactions, are always suspicious of each other’s real intentions. Indeed, human beings are distrustful and forgetful, repeating 12 identical mistakes throughout history. However the last two power shifts of the world were peaceful. Between the US and Soviet Union power shift from the 1940s to the 1980s, and the UK, France and Germany power shift from the 1990s until now, demonstrated how we are able to break the cycle of destruction. Especially, the European power shift proved the importance of diplomatic leadership. Hopefully, as time progresses, mankind may learn to draw lessons from a series of historical tragedies. When Xi and Modi face irreconcilable conflicts of interest, both must will look into the dark and bottomless chasm in front of them and say, “That is indeed a very deep hole which we should not fall into.”

While realpolitik and statecraft do what they do best, the Indian Army must also look at study of ‘The Peloponnesian War’ as part of Professional Military Education for higher ranks as a must as it provides insights into how strategic perceptions based on the innately human frailties of fear, honour, and interest lead a state to war. Thucydides postulates that creating a winning strategy is shaped by a state’s strategic and military culture. Thucydides chronicled an epochal war so as to make the conflict available for examination by future generations in the hope of producing greater understanding of war itself.

[1] Thucydides, translated by R.B. Strassler (ed), The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War (New York: Touchstone, 1998), pg 12.

[2] Athens initially decided to execute all residents of Mytilene after their attempted revolt against Athenian control. The demagogue, Cleon, argued most strongly for this, warning that the three failings most fatal to empire were ‘pity, sentiment and indulgence’ and that Athens must show strength and resolve in the face of this insult. Ibid., 175–183.

[3] https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/indian-ocean-cannot-be-indias-backyard-china/93279/ accessed on 25 Nov 2020.