TECHNOLOGY & LEADERSHIP: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE
1. Technology absorption is the mantra for Indian Armed Forces today, influenced by the recent battles in Europe and Central Asia, there is a mad rush to jump on to the bandwagon of tech savy future ready armed force. Agnipath, Atmanirbharta and many more such initiatives have egged on this idea. Like any innovation and invention, this rush to infuse tech to war fighting which at primordial level is a human endeavour and a clash of wills, after all Clausewitz had famously remarked the nature of war is permanent while the character may evolve. The question we must ask is, are we trying to alter the nature of war. Autonomous systems, machine learning, AI based decision support system and all those high sounding words, are they taking the human out of the equation and in doing so affecting one key battle winning factor of leadership. The paper predicates itself on the hypothesis that leadership may be adversely affected by too much of reliance on tech. The datum line for this study is the Israel- Hezbollah war of 2006. Military leaders today face a myriad of challenges such as increased training requirements, expanded scopes of responsibility and diverse working environments’; all while managing limited resources, budget cuts and manpower reductions. To assist with these challenges, commanders introduce advanced technology as a force multiplier to positively satisfy these leadership challenges. The focus is on the necessity for a military leader to effectively manage technical capabilities, the reduction in personal interaction and the declining leadership opportunities.
2. A challenge for leaders, not often achieved, is to balance mission requirements with available resources by managing the technology available for employment. Many times, the effective implementation of this technology by an organization often depends on the personality of the commander. John Corozza states that the “personality and leadership traits of the operational commander will ultimately determine how effectively this technology is integrated into the operational art of warfare toward achieving military objectives.”[1] Despite these personality differences, commanders must ensure they understand the capabilities and limitations of each innovation and determine which tool is applicable to address the specific concern. Not all situations demand the same capabilities and determining the right allocation of resources may be difficult when the commander does not know, or understand, the full spectrum of capabilities technical tools can provide. The pressure to achieve mission accomplishment in conjunction with an existing over-reliance on technology creates risks associated with misapplied innovation. Unfortunately, the absence of this technical understanding can impede progress by adding unnecessary fog and friction. Technology makes a contribution only when operated by people who know how to apply it. A mismanaged technical capability, not exempt from presenting critical vulnerabilities, are elaborate information network systems that provide a vast amount of intelligence to commanders. Experience, mistrust in the system and intuitive thought may provide a radically different interpretation from that achieved by the cold, rigid logic of microprocessor. Indeed, unless the system can filter effectively and with the trust of the commander, he may be subject to information overload and the processed data could act as a brake rather than speeding up his decision-making cycle.
3. As future leaders attempt to manage the vast and overwhelming amounts of information the system provides, higher HQs may potentially blunder through the decision making-process or procrastinate and yet make poorer decisions.” With such an overload of information it is difficult for a commander to filter the relevant information from unnecessary details, which can essentially paralyze a commanders’ ability to make timely decisions. . Paralysis by Analysis is the oft repeated moniker for leadership in modern wars. Access to unlimited information in combination with a leaders’ ability to make decisions does not translate to improved efficiency. “Effective Decision Superiority does not automatically result from information superiority.” During the war of 2006, tech aficionados in IDF argued that technology driven C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance); precision-strike weapons could provide rapid, decisive victory, very low casualties and collateral damage and strategic results[2]. Israel Air Force proponents believed that it could save lives through the use of precision to minimize noncombatant fatalities and friendly lives by the substitution of technology for manpower and the creation of battlefield conditions in which land elements would do their job without significant resistance. None of these assumptions came true and IDF suffered the ignominy of a stalemate with a non-state actor.
4. Regardless of the advantages current innovations have brought to the war fighter, they have concurrently persuaded leaders to reduce personal interaction with their subordinates. This is contrary to basic leadership principles that proved so effective during World War II. “General Patton’s leadership in World War II offers a good example of the success that can result from personal interactions and observations. General Patton insisted on seeing the battle from the front lines rather than through the
eyes of his staff.”[3] His physical presence on the battlefield in Europe allowed him to create a unity of command due to personal relationships with his immediate subordinates. Through his physical contact with his subordinates, Patton was able to effectively convey his intent and accurately evaluate performance. General Patton’s desire to be on the battlefield, to understand the conditions of the men, to know where his forces were through personal contact and to be able to make decisions based on information gained from personal experience all contribute to the product of good, basic leadership principles. These principles guided General Patton’s efforts, allowing him to gain a realistic battlefield perspective and provided a situational awareness that could never be possible by any other means. The situational awareness he gained from this experience assisted in making effective and decisive decisions regarding the enemy and current friendly situations.
5. Current technological innovations allow leaders to remain connected through electronic means from anywhere in the world. By taking advantage of these capabilities to lead from afar, it may appear that commanders are saving time, making effective decisions and improving efficiency; however, they are essentially sacrificing subordinate loyalty and confidence, face-to-face interaction and realistic situational awareness which go against basic leadership principles. R.L. Taylor states, “With emails that must be answered and PowerPoint presentations that need animating, the leadership within the United States Marine Corps does not spend as much time, as their pre-computer counterparts, getting to know those they may someday lead in combat. The distractions inherent in the form of technological advancement decrease opportunities to interact with one’s Marines.”[4] Indian Army may follow the same trajectory and to some degree this may have already started. While networks are not pervasive yet in our armed forces, the effect of detaching of the leader from the led has commenced. Currently, it is typical for members of the same unit, located in the same building, and often in the same room, to have no personal contact or interaction during a normal day. This is made possible through the convenience of electronic and communications capabilities created through elaborate mobile and wifi connectivity. This lack of interaction completely removes the personal touch and does not facilitate the necessity
for interaction that has made previous fighting forces so effective. The camaraderie, esprit de corps, loyalty and the willingness to sacrifice life or limb for a teammate has slowly deteriorated, which can in some cases, can be contributed to a technological over-reliance. Following the Second Lebanon War Chief of Staff Dan Halutz pointed to one of the reasons for the difficulties the IDF had faced on the battlefield; the tendency of senior commanders to run the battle not by leading their troops on the battlefield, but from their headquarters, which were located in the rear, over-relying on technology.
6. Conducting the war over plasma screens may have been compatible with the assumption that on a battlefield where enemy forces are destroyed by stand-off precision fire, optimal command and control is achieved from control centers. At the same time, however, ‘it may have changed the focus of our command’, Halutz admitted.[5] Vilnai’s diagnosis was that what the IDF had lacked in that war was a simple command system. ‘You can run McDonald’s using plasma screens, not a battle’, he said[6]. IDF in recent years had lost its balance a golden goose was created and named technology; many believed it could win the war. The assumption that due to the IDF’s ‘Ground Forces Digitalization’ program (ZAYAD, in Hebrew)[7],ground forces would have access to much more precise intelligence, proved problematic, whether due to gaps in intelligence (which will always exist), outdated intelligence, or failure to disseminate intelligence to troops in contact in real time. Forces often operated blindly, were occasionally surprised by enemy munitions (e.g., advanced Kornet and Fagot anti-tank missiles and the C-802 anti-ship missile), and fell victim to Hizballah’s tactics. To the credit of Israeli ground forces it must be said that their transformation into a digital Army has yet to be completed, but doubts regarding the expected effectiveness of this development already exist.
7. When technology impedes individual leadership opportunities, a
negative effect on personnel capabilities becomes a threat. This is supported by the amount of computer based training (CBT) and simulation training the Indian Army is aiming to institutionalize. What was once an Instructor’s job, to stand in front of a class and impart instruction would soon be outsourced to a computer. The Army is increasingly transitioning to distance learning and online method of instruction as a primary means to reduce costs and increase qualifications by reaching more individuals further precipitated by the COVID pandemic. Contrary to the effort, reduced personal interaction and decreased leadership opportunities are a result of these technical education avenues. Although technology has allowed commanders to limit personal interaction and decrease leadership opportunities, it does not mean leaders must continue down this path of over-reliance. As discussed above, these capabilities left uncontrolled lead towards negative effects that lure commanders into reducing the strength of personal leadership. Such overt reliance on technological capabilities limits leadership opportunities, promotes a divisive atmosphere and may hinder combat operations. A degeneration of leadership and teamwork as well as reputation is bound to ensue if this trend toward techno-adoration goes unchecked. Based on this concern, commanders must make every effort to aggressively educate themselves on effective technological management and implementation, gain personal situational awareness through subordinate interaction and maximize leadership opportunities for subordinates. Most importantly, leaders must realize that despite the advantages provided by technology, may provide, nothing can substitute for good leadership and human interaction
8. IA officers have prided themselves on being ‘hands on and regimental soldiers’ never ‘intellectual soldiers’, let alone ‘military intellectuals’– to use Morris Janowitz’s terminology[8]. We have been ‘practical soldiers’, basing our professional performance on experience, intuition, flexibility, imagination, initiative, and audacity. Military history and military theory have been studied in military academies and colleges, but were not believed to have any direct practical dividend. But, as already pointed out, since 1999 experience in conducting war or large-scale operations has hardly existed, as most of the activity has long been of counter terrorism and counter infiltration nature in J&K or in NE. To make matters worse, in recent years Indian Army has undergone a process of superficial intellectualization, the manifestations of which have been a pretentious post-modern approach and a tendency to imitate American military thinking in an absorptive rather than competitive form. Doctrinal constructs created by US Armed Forces like Effect Based Operations (EBO) which have been long abandoned from their lexicon continue to linger in our military language. New phraseology like MDO has already permeated into our vocabulary without full realization of the concept and in absence of technology to execute it. It is important for leaders to understand the dynamic relationship between technology and doctrine. Unfortunately, as the over-reliance on advanced technology becomes a significant influence in military operations, technology often outpaces doctrine and becomes the driving factor on how daily activities are conducted but in our case doctrine is outpacing technology. A proper understanding of this relationship and sufficient control measures, the possibilities for destructive implications can be avoided. To prevent this from happening, it is necessary for leaders to understand that doctrine should generally drive how operations are conducted, and that advanced technology is merely a tool to enhance doctrinal implementation. In the event doctrine actually does outpace technology, doctrine must be adjusted and brought up to pace
accordingly in order to provide effective guidance for the operational procedures of the technical capability we have and not what the foreign armies possess. Without this adjustment, vulnerabilities exist that create dangers and hazards that often end with devastating results. Leaders
must understand that technology is not the answer for every situation and without baseline operational procedures technology is essentially useless.
9. Advanced technology has provided capabilities that give leaders the option to establish a centralized command and control (C2) and to increase an already over-extended span of control. It is essential for leaders to resist the temptation to create a centralized C2 based on the availability of advanced technological capabilities; a proverbial long screw driver[9]. Commanders must resist the temptation to make decisions based on the unlimited access to unfiltered information. This, in turn, creates a micro-management situation that is not beneficial for anyone in the chain of command. In addition, technology provides commanders the capability to stay connected with subordinates throughout their area of responsibility with a touch of a button. This situation leads to the creation of a centralized chain of command, which in today’s military, creates multiple issues that negatively affect an organization. Most importantly, this vertical centralized command structure allows for maximum flow of unfiltered information to the commander that often creates a false situational awareness. It is important to commanders to understand that unlimited access to information and the ability to communicate with subordinates through advanced communications systems does not qualify a commander to make every decision.
10. A basic principle of leadership is to know your people. But with today’s innovations such as email, PowerPoint briefings, video conferences and satellite communications, commanders can easily separate themselves from their subordinates. It is crucial to avoid this segregation as much as possible and make every effort to have face-to-face time with the members of the command. Commanders must resist the temptation to utilize communications technology as a means to make front-line decisions. Information or intelligence received through electronic means does not equate to a true operational picture, and commanders should not treat it as such. Commanders must place trust and confidence in their subordinates to make accurate and informed decisions based on their physical relationship to the situation on the ground. Commanders must learn how to properly manage the technology available to their organizations, which will result in proper employment. Understanding doctrine and knowing the capabilities of these technologies will assist in using them to meet the military objectives and end states vice utilizing technology to a disadvantage. If the proper use of the technologies is uncertain, refrain from using the capability until a complete understanding is achieved. In this case, a commander must leverage and include the knowledge of his subordinates to assist in technological implementation decisions.
11. From the strategic to the tactical level, in one form or another, technology has flooded the gates with capabilities warfighters cannot seem to operate without. Whether an operator is searching for the most effective method to find the way from one location to another or a commander is leading troops remotely, we going to finding ourselves deep in a technological age that has arguably taken over the ways military forces fight. Without proper control and effective measures to prevent over-reliance on technology from continuing, armed forces will rapidly come to the realization, possibly in combat, that such a dependency will increasingly produce adverse battlefield effects across all spectrums of warfare.
[1] John L. Carozza, The Unspoken Consequence of Command, Control, and Communications Technology: Enhanced Micromanagement by Risk-Averse Commanders. Final Paper. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 9 February, 2004
[2] Elizabeth A. Stanley-Mitchell, ‘The Digital Battlefield: What Army Transformation Efforts Say about its Professional Jurisdiction’, in Don M. Snider and Gayle Watkins (eds.), The Future of the Army Profession (New York: McGraw Hill 2003), 155–78.
[3] Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), pg 575.
[4] Taylor, R.L. Technology Sound not Technology Bound: The risks of over-reliance on modern military capabilities. Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, February 19, 2009. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA513071.pdf accessed on 25 Jul 22
[5] https://www.haaretz.co.il/cmlink/Haaretz.Element.HttpMovedPermanentlyElement?ElementId=755196 accessed on 24 Jul 22.
[6] Amira Lam, ‘We Betrayed our Constituency’, Yediot Aharonot Weekend Supplement, 1 Sept. 2006.
[7] http://www.defense-update.com/products/z/zayad.html. Accessed on 26 Jul 22.
[8] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press 1960), pg 43.
[9] https://www.claws.in/sub-tactical-general/ accessed on 21 Jul 22.
