STARFISH TO SPIDER: TALIBAN’S TRANSITION
1. Not much water has flown through the Amu Darya but more has been written on the blitzkrieg that Taliban launched to take over Afghanistan. An amorphous and amoebic non state organization is now grappling with government structures to gain legitimacy in the same world order it had shunned and rejected for last 20 years. This kakistocracy has the trappings of a starfish trying to become a spider and this very evolution may be its death knell. I had read this brilliant book by Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom; The Starfish and the Spider penned in 2006 which talks of the differences between hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures; the spider is the centralized organization where everything is in the head. The spider can live without a leg, but no leg can live without the head. This makes the spider organization vulnerable to attack: one thump on the head and it’s gone (or one hit with a rolled up newspaper, as many an arachnophobic could attest). The starfish, in contrast, is a neural network. There is no central brain. In fact, the five legs work interdependently. The starfish can regrow any lost leg and, in some species, a severed leg can become a new starfish. If you believe the authors’ pop-zoology, starfish legs make decisions by some sort of proto-consensus, with an individual leg moving in a particular direction and then the other legs sort of catching on and deciding to follow it.
2. The metaphors like “spider organizations weave their webs over long periods of time, slowly amassing resources and becoming more centralized.” .This is something which all nation states become and so do the organizations within it, including the armed forces. Taliban as a non-state actor or a militia has to now grapple with the idea of having an armed force which would keep the simmering revolution in Panjshir under control and at the same time seek allegiance from War Lords like Haqqani and Dostum who have always prided at maintaining their own militia as this very personal militia provides them the much needed clout to assert themselves in the emerging power structure in Afghanistan. The bomb blasts in Kabu on 26 August indicate that other terrorist organizations like AQ and ISKP may not be aligned with Taliban anymore and the various elements within this compound structure are now operating at cross purposes. These armed war lords and actors of different types shape the situation during and after armed conflict in manifold ways. On the one hand, they are responsible for violence against unarmed civilians/diplomatic missions in breach of international laws, as well as for the establishment of criminal and informal economies based on narcotics and illegal mining. On the other hand, they are the expression of soceital problems because they see themselves as representatives of distinct interests of groups within the nation or representatives of external influencers and may build on broad support within communities. They have the potential to disturb, undermine or completely usurp the processes of peace and state-building, leading violence to flare up again.
3. Generally speaking, non-state armed groups are defined as distinctive organizations that are willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and are not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police or Special Forces like Badri 313 unit of Taliban. They, therefore, possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure which they would like to retain as counter weights during such a flux. They may, however, also be supported or instrumentalized by state actors either secretly or openly. Moreover, the Taliban Government or some factions or officials within or state agencies like ISI directly or indirectly involved in the activities of these non-state armed actors because of personal interests (such as political career, corruption, family or clan ties, clientelism and profit). Nevertheless, despite close relationships with state actors, these groups can still be seen as independent actors since they are not under full state control even if that is Taliban and this may be the reason for them to be attractive for Taliban precisely because of the deniability Taliban can get while getting them to do its illegal activities.
4. Efforts even by Taliban in peace-building and state-building in Afghanistan will challenge the position of most of these non-state armed actors by aiming at strengthening or reconstructing state structures and institutions and focusing on the construction of a functioning state. In each of these processes, non-state armed actors usually become a factor that needs to be addressed to succeed. However, the aim to construct capable state structures would on the whole, limit non-state armed actors’ room for maneuvre and opportunities to pursue their political and/or economic agendas.1 Some groups would face disarmament and, eventually, disbandment. Others would probably be forced to transform themselves and become political forces or integrate into official state structures, while criminals, mercenaries, or marauders would simply risk economic profits and face measures under law enforcement. International peace-building and state-building efforts therefore pose a danger to these actors, who in consequence are more likely to challenge than to support any steps that would strengthen or reestablish the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Accordingly, engaging non-state armed actors other than Taliban will pose a distinct challenge to Taliban’s state-building efforts.
5. On the one hand, peace-building and state-building activities have to be implemented against the vested interests of armed actors in order to achieve positive results in the long run. On the other hand, progress regarding a secure environment is often only possible if at least the most powerful of the non-state armed actors involved can be included in a political process that grants them some kind of political influence (for example, posts in government) and/or economic and financial privileges, which may in turn undermine the whole process of state-building. In other words, non-state armed actors are part of the problem in today’s chaos in Afghanistan as much as they have to be part of the solution. Particularly with regard to already established para-state structures by warlords, rebels, tribal leaders, the various Jirgas or militias, it has been questioned whether it is possible to use these structures as temporary solutions and building blocks for reconstructing statehood, or whether this would simply increase the risk of strengthening and legitimizing these armed actors so that the establishment of the state’s monopoly on the use of force becomes even less likely. In other words, those actors who, in theory, have the greatest potential for state-building and security governance are also the ones who can mobilize the greatest spoiling power. It may not only trigger increasing demands by such actors but also seriously harm the credibility and legitimacy of Taliban.
6. Finally, the task of state building becomes even more difficult if an actor like AQ/ISKP becomes trans-nationalized and re-exploits opportunities across borders into CARs, China or Iran or if an actor is characterized by a loose network structure where central decision-making can no longer be assured. All these factors may make international support or facilitations with these actors difficult. Clearly, there are no satisfying solutions to these issues. In the light of past experience, context-specific, flexible arrangements in dealing with non-state armed actors will always be necessary. Taliban power satraps will have their hands full in case they wish to have a different trajectory than Taliban Ver 1.0 which ended with the Op ENDURING FREEDOM post 9/11. Handling their own sub-groups aligned to ethnic and tribal affiliations as well as groups like AQ, ISKP and TTP would at times put them on collision course with their minders in Islamabad and Doha. These star fish organizations may not like to become spiders or part of a spider organization. While Brafman and Beckstrom in the book exemplify the benefits of decentralization and these very benefits will not allow this metamorphosis. The primary benefits of starfish organization which Taliban enjoyed so far and is now trying to curtail for other players in the country are given in succeeding paras.
7. Resilience and Mutability. Starfish organisations are able to quickly change, adapt, and enact decisions. Also they don’t have a single central leader or base of operations. This makes them powerful and hard to defeat.
The Starfish and the Spider gives the example of the Apache Indians. Spanish colonizers encountered the Apaches but couldn’t defeat them because Apache civilization was a starfish. The Apaches didn’t have a hierarchical society with a single leader or capital. Instead, their society had many different circles, and they had Nant’an, “spiritual and cultural leader[s]”, who “led by example and held no coercive power.” The Spanish could defeat one group of Apache, but that wouldn’t harm any others. Even if they executed one Nant’an, another one would step up. Because decision-making was decentralized, the Apache could also innovate in response to the Spanish attack. An attack could come from anywhere, even if the Spanish had just crippled one Apache circle. Open systems made use of every member’s knowledge, which allowed individual Apache to easily collaborate and act together. It is this mutability — the ability to change quickly and easily — that makes starfish so resilient and so capable of taking advantage of opportunities. In contrast, decision-making in spiders is not only slow, it can be ignorant of the knowledge on the fringe that may be too far away from the centre to be incorporated.
8. Participation and Creativity. Starfish organizations also enjoy greater participation and creativity. The open, collaborative model creates space for people to experiment and take risks, while the flatness makes it easier for people to contribute and have their contribution valued, encouraging participation. Part of the logic is that “When you give people freedom, you get chaos, but you also get incredible creativity.” Members of a group share an ideology , in case of Afghanistan the idea of Jihad and Islamic Emirate but beyond that, they are free to be creative and experimental in their approach. This inspires lots of different approaches which makes life very hard for the starfish’s enemy. What helps this to work is a “hands-off approach”. Member of a splinter group would want to achieve their version of the ideology. But nobody is standing over his shoulder, watching and monitoring them. Such decentralization empowers members because they have more responsibility for local decision-making. This encourages participation and means that people can make better use of their own resources and hence not accede to state building initiatives of Taliban which aims to undermine their credibility and locus standi.
9. These organizations then may seek to change the existing status quo or be a distant agency of the ruling party; they may seek territorial dominance or simply any dominance; they may use physical and psychological violence for different reasons; and they may be predominantly ideology-oriented but also profit driven — or a combination thereof. The resulting web of variables that describe an engagement with non-state armed actor suggests the following key problems:-
(a) Multiple actors often exist in parallel to each other and are often treated differently by the Taliban government; some like TTP will be utilized, some supported, while others, such as AQ or ISKP are combated.
(b) The problem is also complicated by the fact that these actors do not exchange information about their own strategies vis-à-vis the government of the day irrespective if it is Taliban or NUG which in the field may lead to a number of unintended effects.
© Taliban may misuse offers by international organizations or NGOs to avoid or deal with external pressure or internal coercion. For example, they may accept participation in a peace process led by an international organization to bypass legal prosecution or economic or military sanctions.
10. To sum up, Taliban’s internal challenges are going to get exacerbated post 31 August 21 when all external players exit and it has to contend with the mechanics of running a state without international aid or support less few sympathizers like China and Pakistan. While Pakistan would not like to see a strong and stable Taliban as that would allow them to break free from the clutches and strangle hold Pakistan maintains on them. On the other side China would prefer a stable and well established government structure under Taliban to ensure that terrorist organizations like ETIM and UIM do not find traction along the Wakhan Corridor which may upset the Chinese apple cart in Xinjiang province and hence another dichotomous arrangement is likely to emerge in the near future. China and Pakistan or for that matter Iran as external actors dealing with specific non-state armed actors like TTP, ETIM or ISKP need to be aware of the complexities and cross purposes they may be working at, used or mis-used by the different actors. For a more productive approach, countries need to reflect on the changing nature of these armed actors during and in the aftermath of a conflict to apply the appropriate mix of strategies. This, however, requires a much more nuanced understanding of the characteristics, dynamics, and opportunity structures under which those different armed actors act.
