SINDHI FREEDOM MOVEMENT
1. In the aftermath of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s assassination on 27 Dec 07, thousands of angry protesters took to the streets in Pak, destroying and burning cars, trucks, trains, buses, govt offices, police stns and other state symbols. This rage was most potent in the Southern Sindh province, where disturbances lasted for several days, fueled by the slogan “Na khape, na khape, Pakistan na khape!” (We don’t want/need Pakistan). By chanting in this way their separatist temptations, many Sindhis expressed the feeling of being directly targeted by the killing of the woman they affectionately called “Bibi” (sister) or “Sindh Rani” (the queen of Sindh). To them, almost thirty years after the exec of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the state of Pak was once more resp for the death of a Sindhi political ldr. It took Benazir Bhutto’s widower Asif Ali Zardari’s intervention for the public show of anger to subdue. He urged demonstrators to set aside their call for indep by reversing their slogan and declaring: “Pakistan khape.” The tension following Bhutto’s assassination is indicative of the uneasy relationship that many Sindhis have expressed vis-à-vis the state of Pak since indep in 1947. However, observers gen dismiss the pol implications of resentment among Sindhis by pointing Sindhi nationalist parties’ poor showings in elections and their incapacity to build a mass mov, let alone obtain indep[1].
2. Sindhi nationalism is often described as a pol failure[2]. As a result, it has received little attn from India too, which seem only to take interest when sudden outbursts of violence threaten the stability of the state. Indeed, most studies on Sindhi identity politics focus on the 1980s, when an anti-state uprising provoked harsh mil repression and ethnic conflict deepened the rift between various gps living in Sindh[3]. In the main narrative of Pak pol history, debates on Sindhi identity and the related question of the level of pol power Sindhis should exert in Pak appear as a sub-plot. Instead, civ-mil tensions and the contested place of Islam in the state occu the main stg. Matters of inter-province conflict tend to be seen from the vantage point of Pak federalism and the state’s difficultyin dealing with “centrifugal forces.”[4]. This angst came to fore again in Oct 2020 with high-profile kidnapping of a police chief by Pak Rgrs signaling deepening of the chasm between the ethnic groups in Pak plunging the country into a civ war like situation. The politico-mil cabal is bracing for further opposn protests. The Rgrs raided the house of Mushtaq Ahmed Mahar, the Inspector General of Police in Southern Sindh, kidnapped him and forced him to sign an order to arrest an opposn leader, Safdar Awan, Mustafa Nawaz Khokhar, a spokesman for Bilawal Bhutto Zardari whose PPP is in government in Sindh.
3. The process of nation building in the greatly pluralistic society of Pak has remained a challenge as diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic gps have been sought to be integrated within a viable state structure which at the pt of inception in 1947 was an artificial creation with no strat glue binding them together. It is crucial for a state to co-opt different ethnic gps into the pol structure of the state by empowering them with decision making. Pak seems to ignore history at its own peril and the specter of 1971 does hang over it ominously. The phenomenon of ethno-nationalism in Pak has remained in focus for many yrs and its growing impact aligned with Islamic terrorism has made this a hot topic not only in the region but around the globe. Most ethnic gps in Pak feel they are treated differently from others. This is particularly the case for people in Baluchistan, where there has been a long-running nationalist insurgency. Jehanzeb Jamaldini of the Baluchistan National Party, which campaigns for greater autonomy, says it would have been better for Pak to have recognized different ethnic gps as “four or five different nations” within a federation. Instead there is a feeling among many in Pak that one ethnic gp, Punjabis, dominate the rest of the country.
4. While Baluchistan is the hotbed for ethno-nationalism and org like BLA, BRA and BLF, are rooting for autonomy or indep, Sindhi ethno-nationalism has begun to assert itself as well. On 30 Jul 16 the city of Larkana was rocked by a bomb attk targeting a para mil forces veh. This was preceded by an attk in Karachi; a failed attempt on the life of a Chinese engr, his bodyguard and his dvr on 30 May 16. The attk was claimed by an unheard outfit calling itself Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA)[5]. A pamphlet signed by the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army, an ethnic Sindhi separatist gp, was found at the site, police said. “The world’s most plunderous nation has set its eye on Sindh,” the pamphlet said, according to a photograph of it seen by Reuters. “They want to attack Sindh and enslave its people.” The gp was apparently ref to the CPEC. The SRA is the sec known Sindhi nationalist gp to use violence. The first was the Sindhudesh Liberation Army (SLA) which became publicly known during 2010 after it claimed resp for the bomb blast on rly tr near Hyderabad. Since May 2012, the gp has emerged and attacked on branches of the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP) in different districts of Sindh. The gp is currently headed by Chief Cdr Darya Khan. It has been asserted that the Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSQM), a pol separatist party, has a deep link with the SRA. JSQM Chairman Shafi Muhammad Burfat is allegedly op SLA from Kabul. On 25 Jul 2020, Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS) — a conglomerate of four Baloch ethno-nationalist militant groups entered into an operational alliance with Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA). This latest development confirmed the existing links between Baloch and Sindhi groups. However, the official confirmation of this alliance means that Pakistani state authorities are going to experience the dual stress and would impact the tenuous underbelly of CPEC as well as deter potential foreign investments, disrupting the pace of work in Chinese-funded projects and targeting Chinese nationals to create uncertainty in Sino-Pakistan relations.
5. According to BRAS’ communiqué, the decision for creating an operational alliance between BRAS and SRA came following the meeting of senior commanders of Baloch Liberation Army (Bashirzeb Baloch faction), Baloch Republican Army (Gulzar Imam faction), Balochistan Liberation Front, Baloch Republican Guards and SRA at an undisclosed location. The common objective of creating a united front against Pakistan is to ‘liberate’ Balochistan and Sindh. Moreover, opposition to CPEC and ethno-nationalist grievances have contributed towards the alliance. Additionally, this new alliance announced that it will get in contact with other ethno-nationalist militant groups to build a strong and vast united front against the Pakistani state. The fiber of Pakistan’s cohesion is starting to fray and while the oppressed are facing the brunt of natural and manmade disasters, the Pakistani elite are using their plight and the fear of a terrorist blow back to deepen their begging bowl and siphoning them to their offshore accounts.
6. It remains unclear till now what will be the modalities of this new alliance in terms of target selection. Baluch militant groups have in the past targeted Sindhis in Balochistan. It will be interesting to observe whether Sindhi labourers will be removed from Baloch militant groups’ target list. Moreover, it will be important to see whether Sindhi separatist groups will increase their areas of attacks beyond Sindh to Balochistan. Apart from this, the common factors influencing future targets of this new alliance will be political and symbolic importance of the targeted place, potential of international media coverage if the targeted place/individual comes under attack and economic implications of targeting a particular place. Additionally, Chinese nationals could also be a target choice in near future. The cumulative strength of this new alliance is not clear. However, the strength is conservatively estimated to be somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 active militants. Additionally, the alliance has a significant component in the form of Majeed Brigade (suicide squad of Baluch freedom fighters). Recently, Bashirzeb Baloch stated that any Baluch militant could join Majeed Brigade irrespective of the fact that it is not associated with BLA. Similar offer can be extended to SRA. Capabilities of BRAS will assist SRA in carrying out lethal attacks and create another front for Pak security forces who are bracing for the consequences of the TTP ceasefire falling through. In future, SLA, Mohajir Freedom Fighters and even TTP can possibly join this alliance.
7. It would be safe to assert that ethno-nationalism along with inter and intra sect fault lines within Islam are emerging as the greatest threat to Pak. The reason behind this is not only dissatisfaction or hostility to the main ideology of Pak but the realm of security specifically human security. Human security holds that people-centered, multi-disciplinary understanding of security, involving number of research fds incl devp studies, international relations, strat studies, and human rights. The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report is considered a milestone publication in the fld of human security with its argument that insuring “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity. Ethnic minorities in Pak incl Sindhis (14.1 per cent), Pashtuns or Pakhtuns (15.42 per cent, 2006 Census of Afghans in Pakistan), Mohajirs (7.57 per cent),Baluch (3.57 per cent)[1].
8, All the militant threats emanate from regions afflicted with a deplorable human condition. Basically, human security states that a plethora of threats in various domains such as econ, hlth and envt affecting the indl and not the state should be the primary cause of concern for govt. If one examines the various ethno-nationalist revolts in Pak history one can ascertain that all had roots in human security. The map below depicts the variance of HDI in various provinces of Pakistan and reinforces the primacy of Punjab and castigation of other provinces. It is interesting to note that while Punjab moved from a low med to a high med level of devp, Baluchistan has been unable to transition, and has remained on the outskirts of devp. The case for Sindh has been very gradual and gains have not been enormous. People in southern Pakistan face yet more devastation after record floods blamed on climate change submerged a third of the country, killing more than 1,100 people. A surge of water is now flowing down the Indus river, threatening communities in southern Sindh province. Local officials say 1.2 million people have been displaced in Dadu district in Sindh, where hundreds of villages are submerged and there is still more water coming.
9. The failure to provide adequate prot to ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities in Pak is an unfortunate aspect of the country’s chequered legal and political history. In this regard two particularly worrying trends have emerged: first, the suppression of the rights of ethnic minorities such as Baluchis, Pashtuns, Mohajirs and Sindhis, all of whom have had their demands for greater autonomy met with severe govt repression. Sec, the freedoms of religious minorities, such as Hindus, Christians and Ahmadis, have contracted as a result of harsh legislation around the issue of religious offences or blasphemy rules. Ever since its creation, Pak has had to face serious problems in relation to its ethnic and linguistic minorities. The rather artificial nature of the national boundaries, large-scale discrimination against Bengalis and persecution of Hindus were all evident prior to the secession of East Pakistan. The ethnic and sectarian violence in the urban parts of Sindh, most prominently in Karachi, has been particularly disturbing, resulting in thousands of cas. The actions of the law enforcement agencies, in particular the extra-judicial killings of opponents of the present govt, is a matter of serious international concern as repeated human rights abuses have been reported, many targeting civilians, with hundreds forcibly disappeared by the military and a brutal crackdown on NGOs and activists operating in the region. During the 50th session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Asif Panwhar, member of World Sindhi Congress (WSC) called on the Council to look into the gross human rights violations of Sindhi people in Pak and urged to take action to protect their right of peaceful assembly and association.[8] Pak human rights sit has further deteriorated as a recent report unveiled by the US revealed that over 8000 people were missing in the country during 2021 incl 1,200 missing in Sindh province in the last six months. A US government report said that several officials from int agencies, police and other security forces reportedly held prisoners incommunicado and refused to disclose their loc. Pak Missing Pers Commission reported that it had opened 8,100 missing-person cases during the yr.[9]
10. On indep, Pak made Urdu the national language, denying Sindhi its traditional status in Sindh. In 1972 Sindhi efforts to regain official status for their language resulted, in ethnic disturbances provoked by the ruling elite, the Punjabis. While in India Sindhi language had been recognized as one of the official languages of India in 1967, with over 3.8 million Sindhis presently living in India. They have originated from Sindh but have travelled and settled overseas for business and settlement, which brings up the issue of Sindhi diaspora. Today, Sindhi merchants are known worldwide for their entrepreneurship skills and began settling in many countries like Hong Kong, UAE, the United States, UK and more. But by late 1990s, the Sindhi diaspora was classified into two groups: the merchants and traders in Africa, the Caribbean and other parts of Asia, and the second category of people more diversified as professionals, especially in Canada, UK and US. There are 56 Sindhi diaspora org which flag issues of human rights violations against Sindhi populace in Pak. The leverage the diaspora yields in their new homelands can cause blowback in Pak and also result in an international narrative devp against the Pak state.
11. The presence of large Mohajir population in Sindh and demand for a separate homeland and accompanying violence along with the internally displaced population of Pashtuns in Sindh has further threatened the locus standi of Sindhis in their own province. Sindhis also see themselves as threatened by the contd rural influx of Punjabis, many of them mil pers, who, they claim, obtain ancestral Sindhi lands unlawfully. Numerous Sindhi activists and intellectuals are reportedly in prison, some detained without trial, many tortured and denied legal or medical aid. Sindhis also consider that they are deprived of their share of irrigation water and that the province’s fossil fuels are being expl by outsiders for commercial gain, while many Sindhis suffer unemployment and poverty. The opposn to the constr of Kala Bagh Dam (1999–2006) reflects Sindhi concerns. Sindhis accuse Mohajir and Pashtun militants of numerous killings and other outrages, which gave Pak Govt the reason to allow a free hand to the Pak Rgrs in what came to be known as Karachi Targeted Op (KTO) which has brought the province to the edge of the precipice. The Rgrs was first called in Karachi, by late Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto after three PSF members were gunned down at Karachi University in 1989. The Article 147 was invoked and they were dply in aid of civ power. Yrs have passed and the Rgrs have remained as the Pak Army’s vector of imposing its will on the province. The Rgrs, defend their op though, they still believe that had they been given powers of prosecution, separate police stns, and also allowed to appt spl prosecutors, results could be more eff. Spl powers to the Rgrs under ATA have been given in the lt of a presentation given at the central apex committee meeting attended by the PM and the COAS in 2015[10]. Under the powers granted through ATA as well as under Protection of Pak Act, the Rgrs was allowed to detain suspects for 90 days and also investigate before handing them over to police. The high handedness of the Central Govt propped by Pak Army has spurred this ethno-nationalistic strain in Sindh.
12. Ethnicity based contestations in Pak have not only been incr in recent yrs but have also captured the imagination of broad spectrum of stake holders. Pak should focus more on aspects of human security in order to not only comb ethno-nationalism but other forms as well. It is a widespread assertion that terrorism thrives in places where human security is compromised and the same is true for the Islamic Republic of Pak. Within as multi-ethnic a state as Pak, federalism helps prevent national fracturing. Some might look at Pak and see a country divided along ethnic lines. This stems more from a mis-practice of federalism than the sys of govt itself. Pak has historically de-emphasized unitary governance. Similarly, it has apch ethnic conflicts through a narrow security and mil lens, hindering the practice of federalism in its true spirit. As a pol sys properly instituted, federalism promotes and legitimizes each of Pak many represented ethnic gps. Sindhi nationalist discourse should be understood as socially constructed. Three generations of Muslim men, sharing similar trajectories but with distinct social characteristics and repertoires of contention, reinforced and disseminated it. After Pak indep, members of an aspirational middle-class crafted and promoted the idea of Sindh. Moreover, I showed that the production of the idea of Sindh implied a tremendous creative engagement on its proponents. In the process of “folklorization,” Sindhis iden specific cultural elements — notably Sufism and folk culture — that have been turned into identity markers by scholars before becoming ubiquitous in the public space, particularly in visual productions. With an aim to iden assertion, Sindhis est cultural institutions that were later replicated at the national Pak level. In recent yrs, the Pak state apparently seeks to subdue nationalist
demands by replicating a Chinese model (i.e., econ growth through infrastructural investment with ltd pol rights). But nothing eliminates the possibility of new instances of widespread nationalist mob in Sindh. Pak state’s severe repression of dissident org has targeted not only terror groups, but also ethno-nationalist political outfits (like the MQM in Karachi as well as Sindhi and Baluch nationalists). This crackdown has strongly weakened Sindhi nationalist parties after several yrs of heightened activity under PPP rule at the central level. Yet, the revival of Pashtun nationalism under the umbrella of the Pashtun Tahaffuz Mov suggests that there is scope for ethnic politics in Pakistan.
[1] World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, https://minorityrights.org/minorities/sindhis-and-mohajirs/ accessed on 22 Oct 2020.
[1] Muhammad Sajid Khan, “Nationalist Parties in Electoral Politics of Sindh,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 38.1 (2017): 143–171.
[2] Michel Boivin, “Le Pakistan à l’épreuve de ses Nationalismes: GM Syed et l’échec du Mouvement Indépendantiste du Sind,” Outre-Terre 24.1 (2010): 315–323.
[3] Charles H. Kennedy, “The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh,” Asian Survey 31.10 (1991): 938–955
Sayed Mehtab Ali Shah, “Ethnic Tensions in Sindh and Their Possible Solution,” Contemporary
South Asia 6.3 (1997): 259–272.
[4] Theodore P. Wright, “Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis,
Muhajirs, and Punjabis,” Comparative Politics 23.3 (1991): 299–312; Kavita R. Khory, “National
Integration and the Politics of Identity in Pakistan,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1.4 (1995):
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Delhi: Sage, 2005); Katharine Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and
Pakistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, The Politics of Ethnicity
in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements (London: Routledge, 2012).
[5] https://www.newsintervention.com/sindhudesh-revolutionary-army-eliminates-pak-ranger-in-karachi/ accessed on 22 October 2020.
[6] https://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/HDR/HDI%20Report_2017.pdf accessed on 22 October 2020.
[7] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62757605 accessed on 11 Dec 22.
[8] https://theprint.in/world/world-sindhi-congress-raises-issue-of-gross-human-rights-violations-of-sindhi-people-in-pakistan/1008238/
[9] https://www.thestatesman.com/world/8000-people-missing-pakistan-2021-report-1503059887.html
[10] Mazhar Abbas, Karachi Operation: An analysis; https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/180499-Karachi-Operation accessed on 22 Oct 2020.
