SECTARIAN FAULT LINES IN FATA/KPK
- Chitral was in the news recently with TTP launching a full-fledged incursion across the Durand Line and inflicting sizeable casualties on Pakistan Armed Forces[1]. Chitral, the northernmost district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province, lies at the extreme northwest of Pakistan and sits South of the Wakhan Corridor. Durand Line divides it from the provinces of Badakhshan, Nuristan and Kunar Provinces of Afghanistan, with Gilgit-Baltistan to the East, and the Kohistan, Swat and Dir Districts to the South. Geography and Anthropology are the root cause of sudden interest in Chitral of terrorist groups.
2. Chitral’s human terrain is a mix of Ismaili Shias[3] and Sunni Muslims who have lived in harmony and that may not be acceptable to the Salafi/Deobandi hardline ideology of TTP. Chitral constitutes 20% of the real estate of KPK and 2% of the population[4] with a large part inaccessible to the Pakistan Government and Security Forces offering safe sanctuary to TTP, East of Durand Line and thus offering a certain degree of sequestering of TTP from Taliban in Afghanistan which is under constant pressure from Pakistan security establishment to reign in the TTP. The TTP bases across the Durand Line make Chitral contiguous to their base of operations. The recent sectarian violence in Kurram Agency with a significant Shi’a population[5] has forced the Sunni Jihadi groups to respond. This sectarian dissonance in FATA has a history when the Shi’a tribes did not offer shelter to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban who were fleeing Tora Bora in 2001, some clans even gave them up to the law enforcement agencies, which created bad blood between Sunni and Shi’a.[6]
3. The conflict took a new dimension 2003 onwards when FATA became a sanctuary for Punjabi members of banned Sunni extremist groups like Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) who took shelter in the tribal areas. Others joined them after the earthquake of October 2005 which had destroyed training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Sectarian clashes began in 2007 after a procession in Parachinar was fired on with Mortars and RPGs, resulting in heavy casualties. The Sunnis accused Iran of funding money and providing material support to Shi’a fighters. Recruitment of the Zainabiyoun Brigade from Parchinar by Quds Force was another causal factor[7] that exacerbated the violence in KPK and FATA.
4. The sectarian discourse in Pakistan contributes to the present violence within the country. A complex set of sectarian doctrines championed and postulated by the country’s divided clergy (Salafi, Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahle Hadit and Shia) constitute a central ingredient in formalizing and accentuating the ex-communication of the other sects as ‘kufr’[8], at times violently. Sunni-Shia violence is more often than not a Deobandi-Shia conflict, wherein Deobandis have placed themselves as the champions of the Sunni cause and are supported by the Ahle Hadith. While both Barelvis and the Deobandis follow the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, their interpretations are quite variegated and different. “Barelvis represent oral orthodoxy cushioned by devotional practices; Deobandis represent literate orthodoxy with a strict adherence to the classical texts of Islam”.[9] These Sunni sub-sects dominate Pakistan’s theocratic landscape and their divide can be best understood by their differing attitudes toward the Islam of the Sufi orders that was prevalent in South Asia much before Pakistan or sects such as the Deobandis and Barelvis came into existence[10]. Unlike Punjab and Sindh, where influence of Sufi Islam and its Barelvi component is dominant, the Pashtun Sunnis have gravitated towards a more puritanical version of Islam due to influx of Salafi and Deobandi funding during Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and export of ideology from Saudi Arabia. Afghan civil war and the resultant madrasa expansion had enhanced the sectarianism in Pashtun-majority areas. Since the province also has major areas of Shia concentration, such as Orakzai agency, Parachinar and Hangu in Kohat district, and Chitral, this rise of Deobandi extremism has heightened sectarian tensions and conflict, even in Hindko-speaking areas of Mansehra and Abottabad. The violence in KPK and FATA has metamorphosed into a sectarian conflict with Sunni Groups targeting Shi’a tribes in the region. Sectarianism in the province is unique in the sense that it can assume tribe-versus-tribe or village-versus-village dimensions. Since the province is also awash in arms, partly the legacy of the Afghan conflict and partly the state’s failure to prevent proliferation, sectarian violence has often assumed the shape of prolonged conflict in which even weapons such as rockets and missiles are used.
5. Interestingly, each of the sects has tried to define the Pakistani state and society in its own exclusive way. The monolithic construction of Pakistani society as an Islamic state fade away as one becomes increasingly aware of the many “Pakistans” who seek to assert themselves at the peripheries. Nazariya-e-Pakistan however, falls apart when it comes to the question of considering Shias as Muslims and interpretations of violence against them. Pakistani Sunnis who follow the Deobandi and Barelvi sects have contrasting opinions about Shias. The majority of Pakistani Deobandi Sunnis strongly believe that Sunnis are superior to Shia Muslims. The violence by sectarian groups such as LeJ, LeT, Jundullah and TTP is not condemned by Deobandi clerics who have sway over these organizations. It is also among Deobandis that the major support base of the Pakistani Taliban is located; they are vehemently intolerant of Shias. The move to Chitral could have been driven by the idea of targeting Shi’a groups in the region.
6. A wave of intolerance has swept the country, particularly since the broader Islamisation of the society. The militant message gains traction in part because it is disguised in religious rhetoric and feeds on popular notions of pan-Islamism and anti-Hinduism. There is an economic dimension to the sectarian conflict in FATA. Shi’a are relatively affluent compared to Sunnis which creates another challenge where in Sunni Groups are interfering with the Shi’a business ventures. Shi’a had acquired contracts for developing coal mines, but they were expelled from the area by the Taliban who claimed that infidels had no right to extract coal[11]. Both sects accuse each other of drawing support from outside: the Sunnis are alleged to be backed by the TTP and Afghan Taliban and the Shi’a by Iran and Afghan Hazaras. “A small skirmish becomes a tribal war. Outsiders like the Afghans are already leading anti-Shia Tehreek-e-Taliban. Use of heavy weaponry often reduces the military to spectators”, says Zafar Bangash, a college teacher from Kohat. Government schools fail to accommodate the rising number of school-age children. People have no other option but to resort to madrasas and their leaders. These madrasas and their leaders are fully exploiting the prevailing atmosphere of sectarian intolerance to further their political ends violently. Traditional leaders from both sects have lost control over the situation as very young fighters who have studied in the madrasas and thereafter fill the ranks on both sides of the conflict[12]. The violence shows no signs of abating as TTP is expanding its control by backing sectarian fighting. Sectarian violence is likely to become endemic in the region. The regimented use of this fault line for political outcomes has been a constant in Pakistan where in sub-nationalism of Pashtunwali has been usurped by religion and sectarianism.
[1]https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/7/four-soldiers-12-ttp-fighters-killed-in-northwest-pakistan accessed on 17 Sep 23.
[2] https://www.researchgate.net/figure/A-Map-of-Pakistan-presenting-Chitral-district-with-red-color-B-Detail-map-of-study-area_fig1_331844587 accessed on 17 Sep 23.
[3] The Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims, generally known as the Ismailis, belong to the Shia branch of Islam. The Ismailis live in over 25 different countries and number approximately 12 to 15 million. They trace the line of Imamat in hereditary succession from Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him). https://the.ismaili/global/about-us/the-ismaili-community accessed on 17 Sep 23.
[4] https://kpbos.gov.pk/assets/docs/reports/NTL-PolicyBrief-Aug-1.pdf accessed on 17 Sep 23.
[5] Around 40 % of the region’s 500000 inhabitants are Shi’a.
[6] https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/art_mz.pdf accessed on 17 Sep 23.
[7] Although the group currently has an estimated number of between two to five thousand militants, Pakistani intelligence officials state that the group’s actual number of fighters recruited from Pakistan could be much higher. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-iran-backed-zainabiyoun-brigade-could-become-pakistan-s-new-national-security-problem/2033585 accessed on 17 Sep 23.
[8] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-faces-threat-from-within-due-to-extremism-minister/articleshow/87786543.cms accessed on17 Sep 23.
[9] Mohammad Waseem, “Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organisations in Pakistan”, in Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, Robert G. Wirsing, eds., Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, (Honolulu, 2004) pg 31.
[10] The four major Sufi Orders are the Qadiriyya, the Suharwardia, the Naqshbandia and the Chishtia. Sufis and followers of Sufism are found not only in Barelvi and Shia Islam but also among some Deobandi sects. In fact, Ali, the Shia icon, is the prime source of spiritual guidance for almost all Sufi orders. Islam was introduced and popularised in the subcontinent by itinerant holy men and pirs (living saints) belonging to these orders, using, among other methods, cultural assimilation to proselytise among Hindus and other local communities.
[11] Mariam Abou Zahab — Unholy Nexus: Talibanism and Sectarianism in Pakistan’s “Tribal Areas” — Juin 2009 http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org accessed on 17 Sep 23. Pg 6.
[12] Ibid, pg 7.
