SCIENCE, ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

1. This is an enquiry into the quintessential question of whether war is a science, art or philosophy. To start with Sun Zi’s (yes that is the correct way to spell it) book is not Art of War but Philosophy of War.[1] This was told to us by Prof Wee Chow Hou as we navigated the nuances of Sun Zi during an educational stint at Singapore. The Canadian system of Professional Military Education segregates the process from cadet days to generalship in three distinct categories, the science of war at the tactical level, the art of war at operational level and philosophy of war at strategic level.[2] The same has been encapsulated in the table below:-

2. While the science and art of war has been talked of and is well understood, the philosophy of war is something which is alien to most of us. Plato in his epic dialogues[1] raises the basic idea of philosophy being the capability to ask the right questions. Philosophical examination of conflict will center on four basic questions: What is war? What causes war? What is the relationship between human nature and war? Can war ever be morally justifiable? The philosophy of war explores the ethical, metaphysical, epistemological and social aspects of war. It involves examining the nature of war, its causes, consequences and moral implications. Senior leadership of armed forces must seek to understand and address the fundamental questions surrounding armed conflict, aiming to provide frameworks for evaluating the justifiability of war, the conduct of warfare, and the pursuit of peace.

3. However, etymologically war’s definition does refer to philosophical conceptions of war. For example, the root of the English word ‘war’, werra, is Frankish-German, meaning confusion, discord, or strife, and the verb werran meaning to confuse or perplex. War certainly generates confusion, as Clausewitz noted calling it the “fog of war”, but that does not discredit the notion that war is organized to begin with. The Latin root of bellum gives us the word belligerent, and duel, an archaic form of bellum; the Greek root of war is polemos, which gives us polemical, implying an aggressive controversy. The Frankish-Germanic definition hints at a vague enterprise, a confusion or strife, which could equally apply to many social problems besetting a group; arguably it is of a lower order sociological concept than the Greek, which draws the mind’s attention to suggestions of violence and conflict, or the Latin, which captures the possibility of two sides doing the fighting. The present state of affairs even to define war is a challenge and the ever evolving lexicon of unrestricted war, ambiguous war, hybrid war, grey zone war just to name a few creates a dilemma for senior leadership to even define the continuum of conflict and where does the military force fit into the calculus.

4. Senior military leaders can address the philosophy of war by following actions:-

(a) Ethical training and education are an integral part of the professional development of military leaders. This includes all ranks including the officer corps with the principles of just war theory, rules of engagement and ethical decision-making frameworks.

(b) Senior military leaders should exemplify moral leadership, setting an ethical example for their subordinates. They should promote values such as integrity, respect for human rights, and adherence to international humanitarian law. By demonstrating moral behavior, leaders can inspire their troops to act ethically on the battlefield (Jus-in-bello) and also during not-war.

© Encourage critical reflection and open discussions about the ethical dilemmas of war. Create an environment where military personnel can openly discuss the moral complexities of their actions and engage in thoughtful dialogue. This can help foster a culture of ethical decision-making within the military. Higher military leadership must articulate and justify the reasons for engaging in armed conflict. This involves understanding and applying the principles of just war theory, ensuring that military actions are in line with internationally accepted norms and values.

(d) Military leaders have a responsibility to support post-conflict efforts and contribute to long-term stability and peace-building. This may involve facilitating reconciliation processes, promoting justice and accountability and assisting in rebuilding efforts. (Jus-post-bellum).

(e) By integrating ethical considerations into military planning, decision-making and operations, military leaders can contribute to a more morally conscious approach to warfare, one that upholds the values of justice, humanity and the preservation of peace.

5. Strategic military leaders need to be adept at handling the philosophical angle of war and leave the art and science of it to operational and tactical commanders, however, the challenge for the leadership there is no method to get the philosophical construct of war right as there is limited or no education/development on such aspects where in war gets tied into the human and societal construct rather than being an act of inflicting violence. General George S. Patton had said; “War is an art and as such is not susceptible of explanation by fixed formula” and from an operational commander’s view point he was right but when looked at from the view of Eisenhower, war would have been more philosophy than art. Similarly when Lt Arun Kheterpal replied to his superior, “No Sir, I will not abandon my tank. My gun is still working and I will get these bastards”, he must have seen the science of war.

6. Jomini built his theories of war to take a fundamentally reductionist and predictive approach and argued that tactics can be subjected to fixed rules like those of geometry. The idea that conduct of war is largely a science and not an art went beyond Jomini’s interpreters and followers, even General J.F.C. Fuller believed that the conduct of war is largely a science. Science of war claims that the use of various quantifiable methods is more “objective” than using the commander’s judgment and coup-de-oeil. However, Jomini’s contemporary Carl von Clausewitz warned that so-called mathematical factors can never find a firm basis in military decisions. Clausewitz was the first theoretician who in modern era systematically presented a philosophy of war in all aspects. Influenced by the ideas of German romanticism, he saw the world differently from the military thinkers of his age. He was also greatly influenced by Scharnhorst’s pragmatism and considered war as a complex and unpredictable phenomenon. Clausewitz believed only in broad generalities, none of which withstood the fog and friction of actual combat. He argued that a system fails to account for the “endless complexities involved” in war and therefore results in a theoretical construct that bears little resemblance to the actual practice of war. Clausewitz believed that war belongs to the domain of social life; it is neither a science nor an art. It is not a science because it is a matter of action, and it is not an art because it exerts itself not on inanimate or passive human material but on reacting, living force. Clausewitz wrote that the “art of war must always leave a margin for uncertainty in the greatest things and in the smallest.”

7. The question of whether the conduct of war is philosophy, science or an art is by no means an either/or scenario. In my view it is science when we are operating at tactical level, where SOPs, mathematical and technological solutions would define the outcome of an engagement. This is mainly due to the inherent human proclivity to seek certainty in all domains of social life, including warfare. Another factor is the influence of Newtonian scientific theories and almost blind faith in the power of advanced technologies. Yet numerous attempts to make the conduct of war largely or exclusively a science have repeatedly failed. Warfare is too complex, chaotic, and unpredictable to be conducted by using scientific methods, no matter how advanced. However, the utility of such methods is progressively diminished when they are applied at the operational and strategic levels of war where intangible elements play a major role in the course and outcome of war. It becomes an art when these engagements are to be synchronized and coalesced, more like a conductor conducting an orchestra where each instrument is following defined notes but the outcome is an artistic expression. In short, there is a huge difference between using science and technology to enhance the combat potential of one’s forces and applying scientific methods in the conduct of war. Our knowledge and understanding of warfare is a science, but the conduct of war itself is largely an art. However, at the strategic level the philosophy of war deals with the broader ethical, moral and existential questions surrounding war. It involves contemplating the justifiability of conflicts, the consequences of war on society and the broader implications for the military and the nation state. Understanding the philosophy of war helps military leaders to critically assess the ‘Why’ and ‘When’ of conflict leaving the ‘How’ and ‘What’ of the conflict to operational level, it helps evaluate the potential costs and benefits and consider alternative approaches to use of military as a vector for resolving disputes or achieving objectives without resorting to war. By integrating the science, art and philosophy of war into their decision-making process, military leaders can strive for a balanced approach. They can apply their knowledge of military strategy operational art and tactics while also considering the ethical implications and long-term consequences of their actions. This holistic perspective can lead to more informed, responsible, and effective decision-making in the context of armed conflict. As in the past, the character of war will evolve, but the nature of war as explained by Clausewitz will not. Warfare would be relatively simple, predictable and controllable but for its intangibles; the human factor and its psychological elements.

[1] Chow Hou Wee, Sun Zi Bing Fa, https://www.uic.edu.cn/en/info/1077/3388.htm accessed on 23 Jun 23.

[2] Canada, Department of National Defence (1969), Report of the Officer Development Board, Vol. 1 Ottawa, pg 1.

[3] https://www.cambridge.org/core/series/cambridge-studies-in-the-dialogues-of-plato/0D51D0643517D576441B42C6A05D1DA9 accessed on 29 Jun 23