RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM UKRAINIAN CONFLICT
9 min readJun 23, 2022
1. Romans had organized their forces into Legions as a basic unit to conduct combat operations; however the origin of the Divisions can be attributed to French General Maurice de Saxe, Marshal General of France, in his book Mes Rêveries [1]. The combat capability of the Division and its advantage were optimized during Napoleonic Wars under Jomini’s tutelage. It made the armies more flexible and easy to maneuver, and it also made the large army of the revolution manageable. The defeat of Prussians in 1805 put a stamp of approval on the organizational construct and was adopted world over. The Division concept survived the travails of WW-I and WW-II; the doctrinal evolution triggered by technology be it the rail road and telegraph in WW-I or air power and mechanized forces in WW-II. Divisions of US Army operated with aplomb in Op DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM and so did the Israeli Divisions and the Russian Divisions in Lebanon and Chechnya respectively. “Don’t fix, which isn’t broken” is an oft repeated idiom and prima facie seems to be the case here too. Nevertheless restructuring of forces is a facet of RMA that has most armies besotted; be it the NATO block countries or the ideological counter weights China and Russia. The Russian Army had jumped on to the bandwagon of making Brigades out of the Division size forces in 2004–05 but under the present pol-mil dispensation had done a volte face and become more circumspect over this issue.
2. Before we look at the Russian system, let’s just recap as to what triggered the US transformation. U.S. transformation and RMA has always been noted for its evolution in operational concepts premised on acquiring modern and advanced technologies, but less so for creating new force structures. However, the U.S. Army transformation plan, muscled out in 2003–2004 was centered on creation of the “modular brigade combat team” (BCT). Unlike old combat brigades, which were subordinated to divisions and drew upon them for essential support, the new BCTs are entirely self-contained with combat and support units, and thus deployable on their own and usable as separate formations on the battlefield. Accompanying these BCTs, concept of modularity has been virtually permeated into the C2 structure as well as its combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) infrastructure, and its aviation assets. The overall purpose of this transmogrification was to make forces more flexible, agile, and rapidly deployable for expeditionary missions and better prepared to execute modern doctrines and force operations in the Information Age.
3. Russia’s Ground Forces moved away from the brigade-based structure and its underlying driver seems to be a desire to back away from the reforms initiated by former defense minister (2007–2012) Anatoly Serdyukov in view of the emerging geo-political conundrum which has befallen President Putin. Growing belligerence of US and NATO towards Russia along with emerging conflict zones in the so-called Russian Buffer Zone had led to this “New Look” reform. It is aimed to re-form divisions in the western strategic direction. This led to reconverting armoured and motorized brigades back to divisions in Western Russia.
4. According to Russian General Staff, development of asymmetrical responses and strengthening of its forces in the Western and Southern MDs was an operational imperative. Re-formation of these divisions was aimed at adding firepower, strike force capabilities and enhance their capabilities to perform tasks along a “much wider battle front.” The Russian General Staff aspired to establish a variety of differing formations, from Divisions to Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), to shape appropriate responses to various theaters of conflict and develop responses in each strata of the conflict spectrum. Ground Forces’ command conducted a detailed study in 2014–15 and concluded that the schwerpunkt must be to prepare force groupings for executing operations on any axis in “complex conditions” and in “unfamiliar terrain”. This was to offer more structural variation and flexibility, Divisions however will inhibit mobility for international armed conflict like the one in Syria if forces are required to be deployed due to the prevalence of heavy armor and this gap may be bridged by BTGs. Ukrainian conflict has witnessed prolific exploitation of the BTGs with mixed results. This variation also stems from the spectrum of conflict defined by the Russian Military Doctrine of 2014 as shown below:-
5. Russia’s senior military thinkers continue to debate the changing character of war. Despite focus in the West on the “hybrid” and “asymmetric” aspects of state competition, the conclusion in Russia was that the importance of near peer high-intensity warfare remains undiminished, and that strategic deterrence with nuclear weapons and updated air and missile assets, supported by strong and capable land forces, will continue to play a fundamental role in securing state interests to avoid any kind of war (Fig-2) while hybrid capabilities and development of special forces and key competencies like C4ISR, application of special forces, irregular forces, delivery of fires and non-kinetic effects by military means would be the panacea for armed struggles both international and internal[4]. BTGs are part of Russia’s tiered combat readiness system. They are envisioned to be ready to conduct combat and special tasks at all times, especially during the initial period of war, while the rest of the force prepares for battle. The BTG serves as a means of keeping elements of a larger formation (such as a brigade or regiment) immediately ready for combat, as these formations are typically not fully manned and their equipment may not be up to the same readiness standards. In 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia had difficulty deploying and massing combat power. BTGs permit Russia to maintain better trained, rapidly deployable units as rapid reaction forces to buy time for the full mobilisation and deployment of brigades and divisions in the event of an unforeseen, rapidly developing, large-scale conflict.
6. The BTG is a semi-permanent task force found in the maneuver (motorised rifle and tank) units of the Russian Ground Forces and Naval Infantry. BTGs are task-organized motorized rifle or tank battalion-plus-sized combat entities that can perform semi-independent combined arms combat missions. They are to be tasked for conducting deep raids, envelopments and flanking maneuvers. The term ‘Battalion Tactical Group’ is a special delineation of function which notes that this formation is combined arms in nature. By current Russian General Staff directive, each Regiment in a Division is supposed to have two designated BTGs. In terms of composition, a BTG consists of a motorized rifle battalion or tank battalion with varying combat support attachments. These attachments can vary, as they depend upon the equipment organic to the battalion and the tasks it is likely to be assigned. The most common BTG variant is based on a motorized rifle battalion with an attached tank company, self-propelled howitzer battalion, air defense platoon, engineer squad, and logistic support.
7. The Russo-Ukraine War has forced Western armed forces to study and analyze specific capabilities of BTG, it may thus be prudent for us too to recalibrate our responses of force structure and look at a more myriad force composition as the diversity of our operational spectrum and terrain configuration is most complex. Russian BTG (Fig-3) structure is amorphous; nuanced to grouping of forces vis-a-vis tasking and duration of operations. Based on the experience of Syria, plans were also floated for highly mobile “super-light” BTGs designed to provide small subunits with wheeled transport that can “slip between enemy formations and deliver quick strikes”[5]. Ominous presence of Russian BTGs based on one maneuver battalion with additional reconnaissance, fire and support sub-units in Ukraine has been widely assessed as successful, especially for swift cross-border insertion and withdrawal once the operational situation has been engineered to a point of advantage. They can also deal with counterinsurgency and local conflicts. In large-scale combat, the BTG will likely be assigned the most important and/or difficult combat tasks, such as leading the advance of the formation and capturing and holding Key Terrain Features, executing mobile defense and encounter crossings over water obstacles. In terms of command and control, the BTG is typically commanded by the commander of the battalion on which it is based, as the BTG is viewed as a way of giving battalion commanders an opportunity to practice combined arms command before they assume command of a Regiment or Brigade. Russia has been steadily increasing its number of BTGs. In 2016, Russia had 66 BTGs; by 2021 it had 168.
