OPERATIONAL ART IN MODERN CONFLICTS
1. When I dabbled in this Medium initially and penned my third piece titled LOOKING FOR CHIMERA: FAVOURABLE END STATE, not too many people gave it even a passing glance, till date it has solicited only 85 views and it demonstrates my inability to make an important issue more readable and comprehendible to the readers. After much of a sabbatical and some coaxing from colleagues and friends I am attempting to put the concept of END STATE in the larger matrix of OPERATIONAL ART and also how this operational planning and design tool which was to connect strategy and tactics is losing ground in modern era of convoluted cooperation-competition-conflict paradigm. The end state of desired by political dispensations is to deter wars and not fight it and that is the first paradox for the Op Art construct. Much more on the politico-military dissonance later; some of my esteemed colleagues who shared an office with me for a considerable time had been insisting on basics of Op Art, so let me first start by putting the brick and mortar of Op Art together.
2. Over the past five years the operational tempo of our armed forces has risen dramatically. Apart from the numerical increase in operational deployments, the functional range of such operations has broadened considerably with new nuanced layers of conflict emerging which in an erstwhile paradigm would have been non-existent. Rather than confronting Pak Strike Corps and PLA Combined Corps, the armed forces have found themselves conducting coercive deployments, intimidational tactics, using conventional vectors in sub-conventional domains and dabbling in non- contact warfare. They find themselves facing a bellicose PLA in Eastern Ladakh and a maleficent Pakistan offering the Olive Tree rather than the olive branch which is to be surely looked at with a jaundiced eye . What the vast majority of these otherwise heterogeneous operations have in common is that they have generally not achieved the sort of decisive outcomes that policy-makers as well as the general public expected from them. While one can put forward many explanatory factors for this state of affairs, this article focuses on one particular factor that the academic literature has so far largely ignored, namely the conceptual gap between the operational planning doctrine our armed forces are taught at their military academies and the type of operations they are asked to undertake in practice.
3. The core argument of this piece is that operational planning doctrine has remained focused on conventional high-intensity warfare whereas Armed Forces have been employed to confront an altogether different set of tasks. As a consequence, operational planners have been forced to operate in a conceptual vacuum. In many of these modern operations, the planner’s traditional toolkit — filled with concepts dating back to the days of Guderian and Rommelesque maneuvers — could not be applied without an unusual level of creativity. Doctrine development is slow in catching up and not contextual to Indian eco-system in which copying western or even Russian methods may lead to perfidy. From an optimistic perspective, this needs to be a simple lessons-learned process that just requires a substantial amount of time to compile, accept and ideate. Operational art is defined as “the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.” Critique of operational art is based on the argument that there exists a disconnect between political decision-making and military planning that needs to be addressed before operational art can become once more strategically adequate for the political purposes at hand. It can be easily concluded that as we are more often than not deployed on missions different from conventional combat, more doctrinal creativity is needed for developing a suitable conceptual toolkit for planning such operations. While this is an in house activity the armed forces must undertake on their own, the politico-military disconnect undermining operational strategy needs to be remedied by a growing political engagement in the actual content of operational art.
4. Operational art is applied in the course of the operational planning process. The planning of operations can itself be described as an iterative politico-military dialogue. In generic terms, this process looks as follows:-
(a) Any situation that may require an operational response triggers a process of political deliberation, producing a political-military directive from the CCS. On the basis of prudent planning, a range of possible response options are created to be considered.
(b) When a specific operational response can be agreed upon, political direction to the military will assume the form of an COSC Directive, containing political mission objectives as well as constraints and restraints.
© The theatre commanders would then analyze the mission they have been given and on that basis draw up a general operational design.
(d) Subsequently military planners will develop alternative Courses of Action (CoA) intended to achieve the given objectives and compare these with another by means of war games.
(e) The preferred CoA will then be developed into concrete planning documents (concept of operations (CONOPS),and an operational plan).
(f) When the appropriate forces are available and the plan agreed upon, an operation can be launched.
5. This model provides the procedural context in which operational art is practiced: the political dispensation determines the objectives and the resources of the mission whereas military planners attempt to make the bridge between the two. Operational art provides the content of how an operation is designed. The concrete input for operational art comes from two sources.
(a) The creativity of the commander and his General Staff in concert with Operational Logistics team; human imagination makes operational planning an art rather than a science. This is the intangible factor that cannot be found in textbooks.
(b) The second source is the contribution by operational doctrine. This assumes the form of conceptual planning tools that enable the design process without putting an unreasonable burden on planners in terms of imagination. Essentially, doctrine substitutes collective wisdom for individual creativity.
6. Ideally, both aspects of operational art go hand in hand. Within the contribution of doctrine, furthermore, the scaffolding of operational thinking still is premised on theories of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri Jomini. The doctrinal core that provides the conceptual instruments that are the brick and mortar of operational art are Centre of Gravity (CoG), Decisive Points (DPs), Lines of Operations (LoO) and of course the End-States.
(a) CoG Analysis. Much ink has already been spilt over the concept of CoG. In general terms, COG analysis is a military methodology for analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of adversaries. The COG concept was originally coined by Clausewitz and defined as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends”. CoG is defined as those characteristics, capabilities or locations from which an actor derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. COGs are also understood to be those physical or moral entities that are the primary components of strength, morale and resistance. They are endowed with certain critical capabilities to achieve desired outcomes. In order to enable and sustain these critical capabilities, a COG may have corresponding critical requirements. Critical vulnerabilities once neutralized ensure that the COG loses its critical capabilities. This gives rise to an analytical grid wherein the military planner first has to identify an adversary’s COG or critical capabilities. Subsequently, critical requirements and vulnerabilities can be deduced as potential targets to be attacked or protected. This grid in today’s context has to be applied on all competing actors (friendly forces, neutrals and opposing forces) and on all levels of analysis (strategic, operational and tactical). COG analysis remains a highly popular methodology to understand how an actor can be thrown off balance and forced to collapse.
(b) Decisive Points (DPs) and Lines of Operation (LoO). After analyzing the multiple CoG of the conflict players the next step is to visualize an operational design by means of DPs and LoO; both concepts first introduced by Clausewitz’ contemporary Jomini. An operational design provides the general outline of how an operation should develop. A DP is a geographic place, specific event, critical factor or function that allows one to gain an advantage over one’s adversary: it is a point from which a COG can be threatened. Usually, these DPs can be logically deduced from the capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities already identified in the COG analysis. A LoO, furthermore, links such DPs in temporal, spatial or functional terms on a path to the adversary’s COG. The underlying assumption is that the neutralisation of this COG will in turn bring about the defeat of the adversary and as such the desired end-state.
7. Typically, how an operation should work towards its objectives can thus be visualized by several LoO inter-connecting DPs, which can be grouped into different phases in time (operational cycles). These lines all converge towards an adversary’s COG and the attainment of the End State. Graphically, an operational design ‘template’ looks as illustrated below.
8. However the conundrum which beleaguers the General Staff is whether this conceptual reference framework outlined by operational planning doctrine is fully applicable when planning operations that are different from conventional, force-on-force conflict. “CoG, LoO and DPs are difficult to discern in a complex mix of various vectors of CNP like political, economic, diplomatic and military, not to forget emerging spaces of cyber and information warfare. Moreover, questions can be raised over the tenuous link between the neutralization of the opponent’s COG and the political end-state. Lines of operations converge towards this COG, beyond which “one is left in a void, hoping that things will turn out all right.”9 Even the very existence of a realistic end-state may be in doubt or a Chimera something I have been harping upon; a problem that goes far beyond the military aspects of operational art. These issues can be amply illustrated by recent operational experience.
9. The Applicability of Conceptual Planning Tools In many operations, given the political guidance, the concepts described above cannot be applied automatically. When a force is instructed to remain non-kinetic — as in the case of Operation SNOW LEOPARD or for that matter even in Operation PARAKRAM; one can use the COG concept for analyzing the conflict parties, but defeating their COG cannot be part of the mission. Counter Terrorist operations in Kashmir Valley, for example, consider the stopping of recruitment of local youth in terrorist organizations– a critical capability — to be a DP in their LoO for containing terrorist groups. Yet as the kinetic vector of national power, the responsibility for counter radicalization, anti-radicalization and de-radicalization rests with the civil administration, which are in either unwilling or incapable to do so. By consequence, the Indian Army cannot realize its own campaign plan — it can only foster the sort of conditions that favour a course of events in the right direction. The mandate or lack of it prevents them from actively exploiting the vulnerabilities of the adversary. As the targeting of terrorist leaders did not stem the recruitment, the terrorists COG evolved to Deep State in Pakistan and JeI in the Valley. Current thinking about the CoG of the counter terrorist mission rather than that of a conventional opponent constitutes creative re-interpretation of doctrine, yet it requires a higher level of creativity on the part of the planners and brings them in doctrinally uncharted territory.
10. A final issue is that contemporary crisis management, competition and missions tend to constitute multidimensional operations. As such, military security is generally but one line of operations in a more encompassing civil-military campaign design. The trouble is that the entire campaign design vocabulary is by and large unknown outside of the military community. Correspondingly, risks are high that no single actor or organization is in charge of the overall coordination. All operations mentioned above qualify as illustrative examples. Yet apart from the lack of coordination, this multidimensional character also raises questions over the extent to which military planning doctrine can substitute for an appropriate conceptual toolkit for planning civilian efforts. In this context, which constitutes a real laboratory for integrated ‘civ-mil’ planning, civilian planners tend to ignore the conceptual constructs of their military colleagues and vice versa. Since we are not intent of defeating a state or breaking the will of a force to fight as we are not in a conflict but a competition and troubled peace, the question is whether Clausewitz really provides the best intellectual foundation for planning such missions.
11. Another major conceptual hurdle concerns the notion of the ‘end-state’, i.e. “the political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved”. The problem here is essentially political in nature: can a realistically achievable end-state be defined in operations that are generally multiagency and in cohort with other vectors of National Power. Difficulties involved in this regard have significant implications for planning doctrine and operational art, the clearest manifestation is of course the situation where the end-state simply cannot be defined. This can be the result of a lack of consensus between participating vectors. It can also reflect an unwillingness to get bogged down in open-ended deployments as we witnessed Eastern Ladakh wherein LCization of LAC was not an option. The constrains of force and time undermine the deterrence strategy of CT operations: the terrorist groups are playing the Infinite Game as espoused by Simon Senek in his book by the same name. They are not in the game to win but just keep playing and this creates a problem for conventional force to realize their end state. Apart from the complete absence of an end-state, the problem may be that the envisaged end-state does not correspond with the level of ambition in mandated tasks and/or available resources. The strategic end state of the operations in Kashmir Valley is that the civil government would exercise full administrative control in a ‘fear free’ environment. Like stated above the mission given to the Indian Army and the tool kit to bring about the desired end-state do not cohere. Such an ambitious end-state is widely unrealistic given the scarcer available to target the DP of recruitment. Simply put, the armed forces cannot concentrate all their efforts on fine-tuning doctrine for the type of missions they are most comfortable with at the detriment of the missions they are tasked to undertake in the real world. Doctrine and strategy development does not sit still. The problems regarding the applicability of planning tools and forces at disposal to persue a doctrine must be noted by military professionals.
12. COG analysis demands a different focus from conventional campaigning. Rather than taking targeting decisions, COG analysis for such stratum of competition should enable the commander to choose when, where and how to exert influence and help him define decisive conditions, i.e. those circumstances that are necessary to achieve a campaign objective and as such constitute or enable the end-state. Just as is the case for many other developments, however, the transformation of planning doctrine is uneven and occurs at different speeds amongst the different vectors. It can be doubted whether adequate doctrine for the full spectrum of operations has already permeated all three services leave aside the other agencies of national power and even nascent organizations like Defense Cyber Agency and Defense Space Agency who are in throes of a complicated birth. The second question is even more difficult to answer beyond reasonable debate. After all, what is the right direction? Firstly, do the deliberations about adequate planning doctrine need to focus on spectrum of operational missions we may be expected to execute.
13. While current operations constitute a powerful driver for a focus on a wider spectrum of operational application which may further evolve as we gain traction as the preferred net security partner in the IOR. The broader logic of strategy suggests that future contingencies may again look different from what is on our plate right now. Notwithstanding, the doctrine needs to be grounded in experience: one cannot plan for those famous unknown unknowns. Taking into account all recent operational experience of Operation ZAFRAN and Operation SNOW LEOPARD; there is likely to be plenty of material for reflection on a wide range of operations. Second is the inter-agency challenge. In spite of the popular discourse about the comprehensive approach, there remains enormous room for improving the basics of joint interagency planning and staff work. While we opened up our staff colleges to civilians, the presence of the right people remains an exception rather than the rule. On a more basic level as long as staff of the three services are not trained together in operational art and do not understand each other’s vocabularies, how can they be expected to operate seamlessly together in the field? The purple hue of DSSC and other courses of instruction is a mirage and nothing more. Taken together, these two questions (and partial answers) point to challenges that go beyond the doctrinal aspects of operational art and touch upon conceptual choices of Theatre Commands and much more.
14. The complete subordination of the military to political control has led to a situation wherein the use of force is treated as an instrument of policy about which policymakers have only limited understanding. As there exists a scholarly consensus about the need for more strategy in the Clausewitzian sense, i.e. connecting tactics to politics, the discussion about doctrinal development receives a critical corollary on the political level. The doctrinal input for operational art needs to reflect the wide variety of operations the armed forces are tasked to undertake. Yet even the best doctrine cannot compensate for flawed political strategy. Muddled objectives, inadequate resources and absence of a proper conceptual framework connecting ends and means will make an operation depend on hope and good luck rather than on military professionalism. Ignorant policy-making about military operations is at least as important when discussing the lack of successful outcomes. Addressing the problems in operational art, therefore, goes beyond adapting doctrine: it also implies re-engaging and educating the political level in campaign planning. The transformation of operational art is not only about the conceptual toolkit, it is also about who uses it: better tools are desirable, but more competent users even more so.
15. All military operations are in need of political ownership to be truly strategic. This requires expertise and awareness of operational art on the political as well as the military level. The desired reflection process on operational art thus concerns a broader audience that the military. The political leadership cannot aspire to behave strategically without understanding what sort of tactical performance creates what strategic effect. In practical terms, this suggests the following conclusions:-
(a) The development of a joint planning doctrine needs to give due importance to operations different from major conventional combat. Territorial defence and interstate conflict may represent the most extreme security threat, for which the armed forces need to retain their expertise, but this does not discharge them from being able to address lesser security challenges with a lower degree of professionalism.
(b) Campaign planning is not a professional preserve of the military. Planning may constitute the hard core of military professionalism, but the military alone often cannot secure strategic success. This is shown as much by the great campaigns of the past as by contemporary multidimensional efforts: peace is the result of many factors. Good campaign planning involves statesmen as well as generals: the making of strategy needs both.
© Every art relies on training and education. Civilian and military professionals of all services need to go to staff college jointly and not together as is the case today if they are to cooperate effectively in practice. Joint education is the best way to ensure that those engaging in operational art share a common vocabulary and reference framework. Without a common language and a basic level of doctrinal awareness, multiagency cooperation as well as an effective dialogue between the political and military leaderships is likely to stand in linguistic and conceptual confusion.
