NEED FOR A NATIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINE
“Getting what has not been got, guarding it, developing it and then distributing it — these four constitute state policy.” — Chanakya
1. Although not perhaps as old as war itself, defense doctrine has a long historical pedigree in India. In his classic work Arthashastra, probably written in the third century BC, Chanakya identifies the importance of Comprehensive National Power(CNP) as the foundation of a state’s assertion in comity of nations. The book is a doctrinal treatise which deals with each vector of national power and how they all are umbilicaly linked to cardinal virtue of realpolitik, which emphasizes the state’s self-interests and security above all else. This necessitates policies and attitudes that subject the ultimate objective of a state — to maximize power — to temporary objectives such as the creation of various alliances, coalitions, and balances of power. The roots of defense doctrine can be found in Book 7 and Book 10 of Artha Shastra deals with war which considers numerous reasons for the same. However it must be mentioned here that book 7 talks of avoiding war while book 10 speaks of strategies of war. It classifies war into — open, covert, and silent. It specifies on how to engage in these wars and to detect if one is a target of covert or silent war. The book also mentions that if the degree of progress is the same between pursuing peace and raging a war then peace is to be preferred. It also specifies the disadvantages of war, like loss, expense, etc. Chanakya was always of the view that the state must be fortified, army always prepared for war and to defend itself during war. He was also of the view that peace is better than war as it is conducive to prosperity and security of all. The book also specifies the appropriateness of all means during war be it assassination, discord, spying, false propaganda and hostility. Chanakya’s Artha Shastra is a classic on states craft and policy making suggesting prudence, diplomacy and stressing on peace. However, it also deals with doctrines to excel in war if forced in to one. The evolution of defense doctrine has long been a staple of military history. As the history of war has broadened its perspectives, our understanding of the roots and the nature of doctrine has likewise expanded. Doctrine is the product of a complex process in which many different influences combine to produce a ‘standard operating procedure’.
2. Doctrine has many functions. Its first function is to provide a tempered analysis of experience and a determination of beliefs. Its second function is to teach those beliefs to each succeeding generation. Its third function is to provide a common basis of knowledge and understanding that can provide guidance for actions. All three of these functions come to fruition in doctrine’s relationship to strategy decisions. the dictionary, doctrine is defined as ‘teachings’, or in other words, something that is taught. It is a body of knowledge and understanding that is primarily derived from study and analysis of practical experience. In that sense, defense doctrine defines the most effective way of using CNP assets on the basis of practical experience. Perhaps the best definition, one that is accurate, concise, and yet retains the vitality befitting doctrine’s importance, is also one of the simplest: “Defense doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct affairs for defense of the nation state”. Even more briefly, doctrine is what we believe about the best way to do things. Doctrine is thus not dogmatic, but is intended to guide and advise. New experiences and equipment might necessitate amendments to the doctrine. In a healthy defense oriented nation the crafting of a doctrine should be a creative process born of experience but addressing the needs and possibilities of the present and short term future. It should not, however, be prepared in isolation from military strategy and strategy in domain of diplomacy, information and economy. It must be coherent with all the aforementioned strategies and in part derived from it.
3. Doctrine must not be allowed to become dogmatic and must not lead to unimaginative and rigid thought. Doctrine represents an amalgam of collective and accepted advice on the way to employ CNP for defense of the nation and its interests even if they are beyond the geographical space of the country or the cognitive space of the populace. The application of the vectors of national power at the strategic, operational, tactical and procedural levels is governed to a large extent by doctrine and culture. Operational doctrine may conversely influence the articulation of strategic doctrinal construct in that it is in the development of operational level doctrine that options for a strategic concept may be revealed. And the strategic level can not demand what is not possible at the operational level. Nonetheless, the doctrine of a nation’s forces will draw much of its character from the nation’s strategic concept. It is unlikely that two nations will have similar defense doctrines unless there is some alignment of strategic concepts. Doctrine is usually expressed in the form of principles, tenets and guidelines. The expressions ‘tactics’, ‘techniques’ and ‘procedures’(TTP) may be used for the mechanisms that allow for the practical application of doctrine. National Defense Doctrine must play the important role in the standardization of TTP. Doctrine requires judgment in application. TTP imply regularity of behaviour. It is not surprising, therefore that TTP become more important at the Procedural or Technical Level where there is less scope for judgment and where correct techniques and procedures are essential to the proper use of a vector.
4. Doctrine is driven by the following input factors:
(a) National Interest and National Defense Objectives. What is it that the government wishes the vectors of CNP to achieve? Such objectives will be bounded by the resources available for defence and the strategic aim in the event of a conflict.
(b) Perceived Threat. Doctrine depends on having a clear and concise assessment of the threat which nations are expected to face. In particular, a change in the intent and/or capability of a potential enemy could have a profound effect on current doctrine and could well demand a rapid reassessment and change to doctrine.
© Politics/Policies. The wishes of the government are paramount for a society in which all vectors are under democratic control. Changes to political structures, security policies and specifically the defense policy of a government will all have an influence on doctrine.
(d) Experience. The lessons from history are a fundamental ingredient in the formulation of doctrine.
(e) Theory. The writings of strategists and theorists continue to influence doctrine. For example, study of the writings of Chanakya, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini remain useful in any study of crisis and conflict. This does not mean that one theory fits all scenarios; history shows that every crisis or conflict will be different and hence offers different lessons for the future.
(f) Education. Study of past and present crisis/conflict makes for better commanders in prosecution of own defense doctrine during the entire paradigm of cooperation- competition-crisis-conflict and even total war. All involved with the command, planning and execution of operations should continue this personal preparation.
5. Once doctrine has been formulated, it will have a continuous effect and impact on the routine operations of all vectors. The output of doctrine can be divided into four separate categories:
(a) Organization. The higher defense organization must be a clear reflection of national defense objectives and how those objectives will be achieved in synergistic application of all vectors of CNP.
(b) Force Structure. Force structure is best defined as the mix of people, weapons, associated systems and equipment allocated to execute given tasks.
© Training Requirements. Training and exercises must be an accurate reflection of current doctrine and incorporate lessons identified into the formulation of future doctrine.
(d) Plans. Plans are the most specific output of the doctrine process and should reflect current doctrine, but may have to change to cater for variation in context and scenario.
6. Level of Execution. There are variant levels in the execution of the defense doctrine: geo-pol and geo-economic grand strategy and military-strategic which are directly impacted by defense doctrine while the operational, tactical and technical domains would be coalesce the derivatives of the top two derivatives . It is impossible to draw a clear line between the lower levels; there is usually a gradual overlap between the successive levels. The two basic levels of execution are as under:-
(a) Grand strategy is to do with the full range of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the co-ordinated use of principal instruments of national power: DIME; diplomacy, information, economic and military. Grand strategy is the art and science of employing national power under all circumstances to exert desired degrees and types of control over the opposition through coercion, non kinetic use of force, indirect pressures including economic sanctions, diplomacy, subterfuge, narrative engineering, domination of cognitive space and other imaginative means, thereby satisfying national security interests and objectives. The aim of a grand strategy is to provide guidance and cohesion for the use of all instruments of power available to a country or alliance and coalitions to which a country is party. It is as much concerned with the avoidance of war as with its conduct. In short, the grand strategy defines the context of objectives against which governments indicate what must be achieved. Grand strategy is the responsibility of the government, regardless of whether it is operating autonomously or acting in conjunction with other governments in a security organization such as the UN, in a partnership such as QUAD or SCO or in an ad hoc coalition.
(b) The Military Strategic Level is the military component of grand strategy. It is the art of developing and employing military forces consistent with grand strategic objectives in concert with other vectors of national power in two categories as the supporting force or the supported force. It represents opinions on the use of military force , kinetic or otherwise for achieving the government’s or alliance’s objectives when safeguarding its (their) external security. In addition, military-strategic authorities, are responsible for setting out the requirement for military assets as part of the defense doctrine. Part of this military-strategic authority is also responsible for the deployment of military means of power in any given quadrant of the cooperation-competition-crisis-conflict schema.
7. The significance of the layers of cooperation-competition-crisis-conflict schema. The layers of this schema provide a means of achieving the coherent application of force in different ways at different levels in pursuit of strategic objectives. It is quite possible, for example, to apply force offensively at one level, while being defensive at another, both being entirely consistent with a campaign’s ultimate objective. The essence of planning at each stratum is to identify the desired end, the ways in which it is to be achieved, and adequate means of achieving it. If this can not be done at any particular layer, the issue needs to be balanced at the next layer. Thus, planning at the different layers is very closely linked and interdependent. In practice the layers may overlap and the distinctions between them will rarely be tidy. Legal, constitutional and customary factors including legislation and constitutional arrangements may limit how forces of that nation can be employed. There are legal limitations on the use of vectors including armed forces of our nation in internal security roles. There may also be restrictions on the invasive intervention of private space in the cyber domain on population of the nation even if the defense doctrine demands it. Transfer of a nation’s vectors to a multinational agency or to the command of another nation would also be restricted. Where no formal legal or constitutional constraints exist, there may be customary limitations. As a result a government may not feel that it could achieve political support for certain uses of its vectors. There are also legal provisions that affect technical interoperability, in particular where classified information is to be transferred between nations.
8. During the industrial age, protection of national territory was central to the thinking behind defense doctrine. After the end of the Cold War, things began to change and information age has reached a point of inflection. Changes in the political situation in the region and in political viewpoints within the nation had implications for defense doctrine . As a consequence, doctrine development demands a revival. The increased importance of competition and crisis management operations and the intensification of the cooperation between the Services (joint) and between the vectors of CNP, means that the ‘old’ doctrine has to be revised and a new defense doctrine is developed. We have recognized the need to develop a Defense Doctrine institutionally as there is no existing Defense Doctrine to revise. On the basis of the RM’s Op Directive 2009 which is the only higher direction of war fighting available, a slew of doctrines were formulated Indian Maritime Doctrine 2015, Joint Doctrine, Indian Armed Forces 2017 and New Land Warfare Doctrine 2018 which encapsulated the doctrinal construct in absence of a Defense Doctrine. There is an intrinsic need to create a hierarchy of doctrine publications, with the National Defense Doctrine at the apex and the others lower in the hierarchy conforming and reinforcing the Defense Doctrine which should be the keystone publication. The other publications describe above should cover the contribution of the various components (land, air and naval forces) and also the underlying activities, such as joint special operations, performed in support of joint and multinational operations in the military domain but then a requirement of synergy between diplomacy, military economy and information too needs to be codified.
9. Recent experience has shown that competition and crisis operations like Op SNOW LEOPARD require the application of political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, social and commercial, as well as military power. To resolve conflicts or crises, India should adopt a comprehensive approach along the lines of that proposed development of Defense Doctrine that would enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address a conflict’s root causes. While the Armed Forces under the reformed military structure can provide the military element for a comprehensive approach. Many other, national, international, and nongovernmental actors can provide the civilian elements. As this short treatise has shown, doctrine is the bridge between thought and action. Doctrine consists of a set of beliefs about the nature of defense of the nation and the keys to success at all levels. As the history of conflict has broadened its perspectives, our understanding of the roots and nature of doctrine has likewise expanded. Doctrine in its purest form has a somewhat timeless, intellectual component. It draws principles of war from the experience of earlier successful armed forces and their commanders. Those principles remain relevant today. Doctrine also has a practical and dynamic component in that it interprets the employment of all vectors of national power in the light of current circumstances; and for the military to ensure that the armed forces are properly trained in peace. Doctrine has a predictive component. It analyses recent crisis and conflicts in order to learn from them. It looks into the future in order to identify how vectors of national power might be used and it reviews emerging technology to assess its potential. But we should always keep in mind that from a broader perspective, doctrine is also the product of a complex process of different influences. The ingredients of doctrine, which combine together differently in each and every case, include: the nature of politics and political dispensation of the nation, the research and technology to develop weapons and agents to influence the interaction between nations; the influence of formative experiences; organizational and institutional interests; ideology; national culture; and the political/strategic situation.
