MECH FORCES IN BATTLE: BEYOND UKRAINE
1. Beyond the narrative engineering and social media blitz which instead of bringing clarity to the conduct of operations has further obfuscated it; truth and untruth have coalesced to such a magnitude that even to the most discerning eye and keen mind the Clauswitizian ‘fog of war’ has just become more pronounced and exacerbated. Amidst all this fog and friction of war what has become clear is the challenges mech forces have to contend with in future operations across the C5 spectrum of conflict[1]. The term ‘mech forces’ when used here on is encompassing the armoured tanks and also their trusty wing man the Infantry Combat Vehicles, more in the Batman and Robin kind of a relationship, with the anointment of who is Batman and who is Robin left to a later date.
2. For anyone associated with these steel beasts, the sight of Russian columns laid to waste on roads and tracks and in towns and villages are disturbing sights and also a rude awakening, it is not business as usual and to stay ahead of the curve we need to reinvent, rewire and recalibrate (Triple R yet again) our responses. If one could use an acronym which dates back to World War-II and described the situation then and would the fit the bill even today, it would be SNAFU[2] (Situation Normal, All Fu&#k@d Up). In the Indian context, it would represent a profound indictment of the Mech Forces ability to adapt to a new and dynamic post — Ukraine environment. Despite the accomplishments in the past, the Mech Forces have developed a reputation as the “can’t do force” amongst the fraternity with Infantry developing responses for the entire C5 spectrum and while there are certainly extenuating circumstances, the Mech Forces have clearly stood on the sidelines during the recent conflict less the responses in Op SNOW LEOPARD where even in the crisis zone we were able to deliver a credible response.
3. While the TTPs to be devised and the brass tacks of battles to be fought can be devised and practiced. The issue will certainly foster profound cultural change within the Army. In fact, the transformation will almost certainly require organizational evolution and a rewrite of war fighting doctrine. As an example, a single system or system of systems that is capable of direct and indirect fire, ground and aerial reconnaissance, breaching operations and chemical detection may eventually blur the distinctions between the combat arm and combat support arm; especially, Armour, Mechanised Infantry, Self-Propelled Artillery and Engineers. As a result, tomorrow’s officers and junior commissioned officers may be expected to assimilate and execute a myriad of tasks that previously resided with members of their fellow arms and combat support arms. Could it come to a point where the combat and combat support arms will be merged into a single organization and all members undergo identical training? There will no doubt be enormous organizational consequences.
4. However, the challenge is going to be more linked to tech absorption and infusion into the mech forces keeping a futuristic battle space in mind. In a tomorrow scenario, the mech forces will have to become a more agile force, our tanks are too heavy and ICVs are not lethal enough. A future ready meh force must be capable of defeating asymmetric and traditional opponents anywhere on the spectrum of operations, from humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat with frequent and rapid transition between mission requirements without loss of momentum. The Mech Forces must look at a ‘Bounce-Ahead’ results and not incremental improvements and it should happen soon and not languish in the ‘valley of death[3]’. To meet this ambitious aspiration and supplant technical uncertainties, the Mech Forces must plan is to rapidly identify the most promising technologies and then invest significant resources into them in hopes of obtaining Bounce Ahead results. The approach seems rational in that it promises to provide decision makers the requisite knowledge on each of the technologies that will enable timely decisions, focused developmental efforts and reduced propensity for cost increases and schedule slippage. Unfortunately, the doubt lingers whether industry will be able to deliver these Bounce Ahead capabilities within the stated timelines.
5. Gen Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of US Army in 1999 had said “We cannot defeat tomorrow’s enemies with yesterday’s weapons; we cannot win tomorrow’s wars with yesterday’s ideas.”[4]The issue is exacerbated by the fact that, unlike the last few decades, crisis, confrontations and conflicts are no more confined to skirmishes in restricted terrain with a 4GW adversary, we now actually have a huge monolithic threat called a ‘two front conflict’ to justify innovation and developmental programs. Most security studies experts had prophesied that near peer competition will not emerge as a scenario and most threats would be by non-state actors operating below the conventional threshold, however Ukraine has turned tables on any such suppositions. Shifting power relationships, ad hoc security structures, international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, competition for resources and urbanization are catalysts for future conflict that should not be ignored. Past mistakes further testify to the need for maintaining a technological edge. Some of our greatest civilian and military thinkers have been criticized for lack of foresight and for wasting energy preparing for the last war or for that matter the war they are most comfortable with. As we look to the future, it seems we know less and less about when, where, and how spectrum of conflict will pan out. Nevertheless, we do know that the higher end of the C5 spectrum is occurring more frequently and that our future enemies are likely to develop and employ asymmetric approaches to warfare. Beyond lethality and survivability, it seems the secret to remaining relevant for the Mech Forces of the future will be improving flexibility and agility.
6. The armor/anti-armour field has been a continuous horserace between penetration levels and armor protection levels with neither side holding
the lead for very long but in the present conflict it seems that anti-tk weapon has an upper hand. To get the desired effects, we may have to re-evolve our war fighting concepts for mech forces, the answer to the problem is probably the development of a system of systems; not a single vehicle with a solitary role but suite of networked platforms that perform numerous
functions in symphony. (Fig-1) This system of systems approach is likely to involve numerous components that act in harmony to perform the required functions. The system will in all probability include ground and air components, with some of them manned and others being robotically controlled.
7. The mech forces configured themselves on the iron triangle (fig-2), however the evolving battle space and the dynamic operating environment has added three more dimensions to the iron triangle and converted it into an iron hexagon (fig-2A). The balance between these new requirements is important for ensuring that armoured vehicles are not restricted by their design constraints. Battle space of the future will be more complex, diverse and dangerous, the role of mechanised infantry will also be as important to combat operations within the system of systems configuration. Ukraine has visibly demonstrated to us and confirmed my hypothesis of 2017 wherein I had visualized the application of mech forces in full spectrum operations in urban terrain. There is a growing consensus that future operations will be conducted in urban environment with unpredictable variables to consider, such as dense populations, subterranean operations, multi-level infrastructure and dense compact terrain. More importantly the whole idea of bypassing urban terrain and use of terms as masking are now a pipe dream. A weaker adversary would draw you in to the urban battle space to offset the entire steel hexagon and reduce the asymmetry to naught.
8. The three things to evaluate the hexagon in the practical sense are cost, weight and the laws of Physics. One will have to make trade-offs in the choices one makes with regards to combat utility, the crew and the human factor and the vehicle complexity. There must be a balance between all elements of the Steel Hexagon, where requirements managers have to assess the various risks in conjunction with the task to know where the priorities must lie. Dense urban environments may call for increased mobility, whereas the chief concern in the open deserts may be lethality. While fighting the battle is a complex challenge the more complex issue is reaching the point of decision, and the oft repeated adage we have grown up with, ‘fastest with mostest’ is by no means a cake walk. The two segmented parts of this calculus is strategic mobility and tactical mobility. Ukraine has shown to us the Russian ability of strategic mobility in good measure but where the Russian juggernaut has come to a grinding halt is the tactical mobility. The debate between tracked and wheeled vehicles is without doubt an emotional one, but rational decisions are the outcome of widespread understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of each system and the unique capabilities they contribute. Emotions aside, the Army should not lose sight of the fact that the issue is one of capability; getting the biggest bang for the buck and technology available. For the sake of the individual
soldier and unit, the Army must not misplace the notion that the fundamental issue is mobility. Mobility is the essential enabler of maneuver and freedom of maneuver is victory’s cornerstone; be it in the desert or in the river corridors.
9. As far as survivability is considered, the extraordinary lethality of modern anti-tank weapons, many regard crew survivability as the most significant challenge for designers of combat systems. Armored vehicles have become increasingly vulnerable to a wide range of threats, ranging from small arms to shaped charge warheads, long rod penetrators, top -attack munitions, mines, chemical weapons, drones and in future to DEWs. In my view we need to zoom out and not look at the effects or lack of it on being hit but rather aim at the concept of; if you can be seen, you can be hit and if you can be hit, you can be killed. This leads to an intuitive conclusion that survival on tomorrow’s battlefield is perhaps more a function of hit avoidance than survival given a hit. The problem is intensified by the fact that optimal protection against one type of threat does not guarantee success against the other. KE and CE weapons have different characteristics that require
different mechanisms to defeat. The strategy, as depicted in Fig 3, is a global approach to survivability that will depend as much on not being detected, acquired, or hit as it does on preventing penetration and a kill given a hit.
10. The disturbing scenes of tanks and ICVs abandoned as they ran out of fuel or columns waiting to be resupplied from Ukraine are manifestation of poor logistics. Survivability here refers to improving the logistical tail that supports mech formations, in addition to the traditional idea of survivability, aspects such as reliability and fuel efficiency also contribute to survivability. Survivability has become increasingly important as it allows armoured vehicles to stay deployed. If an armoured vehicle can operate for 72 hours without resupply or maintenance, the logistical effort to keep vehicles in action is substantially reduced. This would call for matching mobility of logistic echelons and also the capacities to carry out module based repair within the tactical units and not rely on external support. Ease and speed of production will also become an important factor in a prolonged conventional conflict where logistics and attrition become vital. Ukraine conflict has been a myth breaker for all those prophecy makers who have been calling out for a swift, short, decisive and conclusive conflict. The industrial capacity of a nation to replace a main battle tank
will contribute to the strategic paradigm of survivability.
11. The inability to amass its superior fire power at point of decision by Russian forces which have relied on maneuver by fire as a basic tenet of Deep Battle and what was clear in all their articulation during the course of instruction attended at General Staff Academy in Moscow seems to be precipitated by lack of sensor shooter linkages. Connectivity exceeds beyond a formation of ground units, it should be a network established between units in the land, sea, air, space and cyber domains assisted by Artificial Intelligence in cognitive domain. By equipping armoured vehicles with sensors, such as the UK’s upcoming Ajax, which has state of the art AI assisted sensors (ISTAR), the situational awareness of crews inside the vehicle is increased exponentially and also its ability to harness multi-domain capacities of the armed forces rather than rely on its own weapon system. Indeed, this level of advanced connectivity will have a huge effect on the survivability of mech forces. Ajax sensors enable automated search, tracking and detection — effectively giving crews the ability to react to threats long before they are detected themselves. A modern-day battle field management system will let users see where every unit is on the map in real time. Connectivity is one of the key ways of improving command and control over multiple domain assets. A connected soldier system interface that takes the information, through artificial intelligence and machine learning to strip out extraneous data can provide the soldiers with the information that they need should be a game changer.
12. The mech formations will in future feature autonomous robotic platforms that can deliver solutions that current formations are not capable of. The usefulness of robotics and automation has already been demonstrated in the commercial and civilian sector, with technologies such as AI-driven cars forecasted to hit our roads in the coming years. However, the civilian sector benefits from more data-rich environments, fewer constraints (such as armour and armament) and conversely, fewer expenses. The ways in which autonomous vehicles will be a disrupting force for armoured vehicles are obvious. Autonomous and AI-driven vehicles will be able to perform tasks that can be too dangerous for humans,
such as mine and IED clearing. Robotics may also be the key to successfully conducting combat operations of the future, such as subterranean combat and operations in the confines of megacities and dense urban environments. Robotics will prove to be invaluable in subterranean operations where small hallways, lack of cover, and lack of navigation options will greatly increase risk for mech infantry units. With a constellation of ground and air robotics to provide lethality, protection and mobility. With additional robotics
support, ground units will gain a level of situational awareness that is not possible with current equipment and formations. Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) are a technology that has the potential to disrupt defense in many ways.
13. The final piece of the hexagon is adaptability. Adaptability is a vehicle’s ability to adapt to different combat scenarios. The ability for a single vehicle to be able to perform a variety of missions, ranging from low to high intensity, will ensure defense departments won’t have to procure a new vehicle every time they want to deploy in a new combat scenario. Modularity is one of the most effective ways of achieving this. Rheinmetall, has developed a new vehicle called Lynx, which is likely the first of a new generation. It is a modular vehicle which can be adapted quite rapidly to fit different requirements. As demonstrated recently in Paris, one version was fitted with composite rubber tracks developed by Soucy, which offer many advantages. They are much quieter, lighter, more fuel efficient and impart less vibrations. This particular module would be ideal for urban warfare. We can see how important modularity will be going forward. A chassis which can be easily modified not only enables vehicles to perform in high and low-intensity
combat, it also has growth potential which will prolong the lifespan of a vehicle.
14. Whatever shape it takes, the mech forces must develop and provide the combat soldiers with the most lethal and survivable system possible for obtainable money and ensure we don’t ever see our forces embroiled in a Ukraine like situation. The mech forces must engender the same sort of confidence among our decision makers and troops alike because if it can’t, the Mech forces would be left alone and our punitive options will stay with the proven winners. It is indeed a tough challenge and mech forces are literally battling for their soul. With these kinds of risks and so much at stake, the mech forces better get it right.
[1] C5 would refer to cooperation-competition-crisis-confrontation-conflict paradigm which is the new spectrum of conflict.
[2] Gordon Rottman, SNAFU Situation Normal All F***ed Up: Sailor, Airman and Soldier Slang of World War II (General Military), Osprey Publishing, October 22, 2013
[3] There are nine Tech Readiness Levels (TRLs). Academia tends to focus on TRLs 1–4, whereas industry prefers to work with TRLs 7–9. Therefore, TRLs 4–6 represent a gap between academic research and industrial commercialization. This gap is colloquially referred to as the technological “valley of death” to emphasize that many new technologies reach TRLs 4–6 and die there. https://www.pwc.no/en/bridging-the-technological-valley-of-death.html accessed on 13 Mar 22.
[4] Roberto Suro and Bradley Graham, “Army Plans Lighter, More Mobile Forces,” Washington Post (Oct 8 1999)
[5] Source: Future Combat Vehicle; a multi-mission system of systems concept, Briefing by Dr. Richard McClelland to the ASB Plenary Session, 13 Apr 99
