DRONES AND BATTLE SPACE IN THE SUB CONTINENT
The distant conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh which most of us had no idea ever existed has already provided a sharp impetus on a debate as to how future battles might be fought in the sub-continent. The war has been most visibly characterized by video footage of drones decimating armoured fighting vehicles, artillery as well as infantry, with devastating effect. It’s not widely understood in the West, but this conflict has the potential to snow ball into the sub-continent, dragging China, India and Pakistan more overtly into kinetic use of non contact force. The use of armed drones isn’t new, of course. Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) armed with Hellfire missiles were used extensively in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Pakistan has already used Barraq its indigenously developed UCAV in FATA and KPK during Operation RADD-AL-FASAD and China has an inventory of humongous proportions of such aerial platforms.
Turkey though a newer entrant in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) design and production, it is arguably the first country to extensively use armed drones in conventional operations. In other words, Turkey is setting an example of how to use armed UAVs against opposing military forces both today, and in the future. Pakistan after having been spited by OIC has already begun to align itself with Turkey as an alternative to the leadership of the Ummah ( I had written of the same in an article published in CLAWS)1 may have not yet reached the level Turkey is at in drone design and deployment until very recently (e.g., 2017, when Pakistan announced Project AZM)2. Nevertheless, Pakistan is rubbing its hand in glee and has already commenced negotiations for purchase of these drones3. Last time the Pakistan military signed a major contract with Turkey was for attack helicopters but that got stymied due to US intervention, however the widening chasm between Turkey and USA has offered Pakistan a veritable straw which they can hold on to for dear life4.
Presently, Turkey is relying on two locally developed — and mass-produced — designs to spearhead its operations in Syria, Libya and Armenia: the Bayraktar TB2 and the Anka-S. Both UAVs are medium-altitude and long-endurance (MALE) designs, but from two different Turkish original equipment manufacturers (OEM). Exports of thee Turkish military drones are increasing and have the propensity to upset the tenuous military balance of power in the Caucasus, Middle East and of course South Asia as well. Azerbaijani videos showcasing armed drones attacking Armenian forces located inside the Nagorno-Karabakh region, were the best organized sales pitch for Turkish Drones which has made every nation sit up and take notice. Turkish defense company Baykar Defense had officially announced the export of TB-2 drones to Qatar and Ukraine in as far back as in 2018. However, according to many defense and security analysts, those drones are also flying in other conflict zones too.
Fig-1 : Turkish Defence Aerospace Export
Turkish companies see Asia as a potential market. Turkish Aerospace CEO Temel Kotil told Nikkei, “In Asia, we especially see Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as strategic markets.” Turkey’s newly assertive foreign policy can hinder exports, as Ankara finds itself at odds with western states that are key technology suppliers, which can impose export restrictions on components. US and Canada have decided to impose export restrictions on some equipment and technology for military unmanned aerial vehicles in the near future. Such risks are forcing Turkey to consider localization or diversifying its supply chain.
Each drone costs far less than a crewed platform or a reusable RPA. In the future, rapid manufacturing technologies will allow them to be acquired at low cost and used in large swarms. That’s a potential game-changer for land warfare. This has generated debate on whether expensive and technologically sophisticated armored vehicles can survive in future battles against masses of cheap ‘suicide drones’. Is the tank, which first emerged on the battlefields of the Western Front in 1917, now approaching the twilight years of its military utility?
With India still going ahead with attempted modernization of its mechanised forces; the likelihood of large numbers of low-cost drones operating over the future battle space should be a concern for defence planners. These efforts to provide state of the art equipment to land forces is important for the future capability of the Indian Armed Forces, and it would be premature to write off these vehicles. But the drones can’t be ignored either. Decisions need to ensure capability is effective even in the face of rapid technological shifts. The suicide drone isn’t going to disappear from the battle space and, given the sophistication of the systems now being used by both sides in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and its easy access to our putative adversaries on both sides, it’s prudent to consider the capabilities that might be employed by them in the region. An assessment of whether our future combat systems can survive is vital to the capability development process. The Indian Armed Forces cannot assume that it will operate only against an opponent that doesn’t have a credible anti-armour capability.
Without good and cogent intelligence, forces in a battle space are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at an unseen opponent. The best way to gain intelligence is through a mix of electronic and human intervention. The second step in responding to this challenge must be to pursue a fast, resilient and survivable very low altitude air-defence capability that is highly mobile. It needs to be able to directly support vehicles carrying infantry and protect systems such as self-propelled artillery, while defending itself. The evidence from Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that drones attack battlefield air defence first to gain and maintain control of the low-altitude airspace before attacking ground combat systems.
Mechanised forces must be prepared to conduct operations in non-contiguous areas of ops. In noncontiguous operations, the mechanised force will be required to operate independently, removed from Brigade combat support and logistic assets by distance and time. Additionally, subordinate squadron/company teams may operate in isolated pockets, connected only through the integrating effects of an effective concept of operations. Noncontiguous operations place a premium on initiative, effective information operations, decentralized security operations and innovative logistic measures.
Classical analysis of past campaigns has brought to fore the primacy of an armed force willing to learn and adapt and that too faster than the adversary has been able to create, made to order solutions of complex conundrums of force employment, force protection and force application. The same is evident from the evolution in tactics and technology by Russians in the intervening period between the two Chechnya campaigns and the Israelis in Lebanon and Gaza. It is now our turn to upset the adversary’s OODA loop by adapting faster than he can acquire the weapons he is aspiring to create asymmetry with.
The Indian government’s force structure plan must include development of directed-energy weapons5 and an advanced surface-to-air missile system beyond the man-portable surface-to-air missile and must aim to enhance the army’s ability to counter crewed aircraft and low, medium or even high-altitude drones. With cheaper drones likely to cost around $100,000 each versus a $50 million armoured vehicle, the drone wins the value-for-money test. The force structure plan has to have the right answer for generating asymmetries to defeat the drones with directed-energy weapons and greater investment in counter drone systems using electronic warfare technology, and ultimately compact solid-state laser weapons. These initiatives must be fast-tracked.
The roles of these weapons and systems should be expanded beyond defense of individual vehicles. Speed and sustained effect are crucial against large swarms of cheap, lethal UAVs. It doesn’t make sense to try to hit a $100,000 drone with a million-dollar missile. It’s also important to recognize that, unlike India our adversaries may have no ethical or legal concerns about using autonomous weapons. They will use these new technologies without constraint on and over the battle space. If we have to fight a major military powerhouse like PLA or an upstart Pakistan Army, we will need to be able to attack with our own swarms; else we’ll go into battle with one hand tied behind our back.
It seems increasingly clear that mechanised forces are playing a diminishing role. For many, the initial view may be that mechanised forces has little or no place in the style of warfare common today and in future too. While there may be some validity in all of these criticisms, they are flawed or incomplete arguments that rely on tenuous assumptions. It is unacceptable with almost ten years of combat experience of mechanised forces in modern conflict scenarios world over that our tactics stay dated, they should be consigned to history books and fresh SOPs formulated from the acquired experience in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Nagorno-Karabakh . An institutional view needs to be taken on what it takes for mechanised forces to be relevant, efficient and coherent in future operations. This would mandate an ab-ovum look at doctrines, tactics, training and logistics. A balance has to be struck between capability development of mechanised forces for conventional operations and such non contact but kinetic warfare.
1Col. Harsh Vardhan Singh Leadership Of Ummah: Choices For Pakistan https://www.claws.in/leadership-of-ummah-choices-for-pakistan/ accessed on 29 Nov 2020.
2 Project Azm was formally initiated by the PAF in July 2017, and its agenda is to develop an FGFA, a medium-altitude, and long-endurance (MALE), new munitions, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and multiple other projects.Upon announcing the initiation of Project Azm, the then Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sohail Aman had informed that the design phase of the Male Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has reached its “final stages”.
3 https://timesofislamabad.com/01-Dec-2020/pakistan-in-talks-with-turkey-to-buy-state-of-the-art-military-drones accessed on 02 Dec 2020.
4https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/01/14/pakistan-extends-turkeys-deadline-to-deliver-t129-helos/ accessed on 01 Dec 2020.
5 India is reported to have developed a system called KALI, or “kilo ampere linear injector,” a linear electron accelerator for targeting long-range missiles. Once a missile launch is detected, KALI is supposed to “quickly emit powerful pulses of Relativistic Electrons Beams (REB)” that can damage electronic systems on-board. KALI has been developed by the DRDO and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-are-indias-plans-for-directed-energy-weapons/ accessed on 01 Dec 2020.
