DETERRENCE OF GREY ZONE WARFARE
“When Deterrence fails, wars happen, when Deterrence succeeds Grey Zone happens, when Grey Zone fails, wars happen again.” — Me
1. Deterrence became part of military lexicon post World War-II with onset of the Cold War between NATO and Warsaw Pact Nations[1]. Character of war evolved with conflicts transcending from inter-state to state v/s non-state wars during the early part of 21st Century and focus shifted from preventing conventional and nuclear conflict to preventing terrorist attacks and put an end to insurgencies and separatist movements. But as it is said that ‘History tends to repeat itself’[2]; near peer rivalry and inter-state wars rose from the ashes like the phoenix and has captured every military thinker’s attention with conflicts in Georgia, Israel, Ukraine and Armenia. Dissuasion and Deterrence as concepts are about preventing war. It is not a panacea to a hostile security calculus but takes a threat-based approach to convince belligerent states that offensive action is not in their best interest. Deterrence can be conceptualized along an escalatory continuum where in the severity of actions or the impending actions deter the nation from adopting a course of action. Deterrence kicks in only after dissuasion fails. Credible Deterrence occurs when a state has robust capabilities that an adversarial attack would not be able to overcome or that the impact of the attack would be significantly diminished by a near equitable response. Punitive Deterrence is executed when an aggressor state chooses not to engage in offensive actions as it believes that they would be subject to such punishment both in kinetic and non-kinetic domain that would be more costly than what would be gained from an offensive action. In a perfect scenario, a state’s defense capabilities should be strong enough to achieve punitive deterrence and in doing so credible deterrence is incidental.
2. The challenge of deterring major conventional offensives is taking on renewed importance in an era of strategic competition where near peer adversaries are questioning the established balance of power and rule of law. In the C5 Continuum this competition is primarily playing out below the threshold of conventional conflict war and has created a more immediate and persistent challenge for deterrence in the Grey Zone vis-à-vis conventional and nuclear deterrence. Grey zone aggression is defined as an integrated campaign to achieve political objectives while remaining below the threshold of outright warfare. Such campaigns involve an incremental application of vectors of CNP to achieve desired results without triggering a decisive military response[3].Grey Zone Warfare can be segregated from other categories of conflict. Fig 1 suggests, unconventional conflict or irregular warfare refer to insurgencies and forms of large-scale terrorism. Hybrid Warfare, in Frank Hoffman’s concept, is a form of conflict in which unconventional types are mixed with traditional conventional warfare. Grey zone competition falls into the space of measures short of armed conflict. It can involve coercion and some minimal violence but is generally non-kinetic and non-contact in character. The mutation of Fig-1 to encapsulated Grey Zone Warfare has been illustrated in Fig-2. Despite the conceptual overlap of the “Grey Zone” and “Hybrid Warfare,” they are surely not synonymous. Hybrid Warfare is the combined use of conventional and unconventional tactics that do cross the line of warfare. Some of the hybrid tactics used, such as disinformation, may be in the grey zone. Grey zone conflict is only the tactics that does not cross the line of state-level aggression. Hybrid warfare is focused on events at the tactical level, while the grey zone encompasses the long-term strategic considerations of C5 continuum.
3. Grey zone conflict has become a topic of interest predominantly because of the actions of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea over the past fifteen years. These states have used disinformation and engaged in cyber-attacks through hackers and proxies to penetrate security systems and cause low-level damages. Russia and China have both made creeping territorial expansions but through different means. In 2014, Russia used disinformation to aggravate tensions in Crimea, leading to its annexation. In 2015 and 2016, a Kremlin linked hacker, Sandworm[4], infected Ukrainian utilities with malware and left thousands of Ukrainians without power. In 2017, Russia was also linked to a virus that rendered the IT system of Maersk, a Danish shipping company, useless for a week, costing 300 million USD in losses. This is in addition to countless cases of disinformation and media control targeted against western alliances and NATO
operations. The strategy is labeled as “simmering borscht,[5]” where Russia tries to expand its influence without triggering a western response. Since 2014, China has been building bases on islands in the South China Sea to extend and solidify its territorial claims. China’s behavior on land borders in 2017 at Doklam and in 2020 at Galwan has been referred to as the “salami-slicing[6]” where it slowly erodes the international order and existent norms and protocols, divides alliances and tries to assert its preferred interpretation of existing international laws. China’s use of fishery and xiakong villages to expand its control of the South China Sea and in vicinity of Line of Actual Control (LAC) through deliberate and deniable acts of aggression are the perfect example of grey zone conflict. The ties between Chinese companies and the government have also proven to be a point of grey zone conflict with Huawei leading to concerns amongst the Five Eyes. While Iran and North Korea are not recognized as key players in great power competition, they have been noted for increased grey zone aggression through political, economic, cyber, and military actions since 2016 with Quds Force of Iran taking lead in all sub-conventional conflicts raging in West Asia.
4. The paradox is that deterrence in conventional and nuclear domain trigger grey zone warfare. The first challenge which is posed by Grey Zone Warfare to the concept of deterrence is that it is intrinsically ambiguous and deterrence relies on identifiable offensive actions by adversary and action/counter action/punishment meted out in response. Extreme end of deterrence continuum is punitive deterrence, based on direct and violent counter response, usually targeted at military infrastructure or resulting in direct violence against civilians. Yet, damage to power grids and cyber networks runs the risk of being just as catastrophic. Extended power outages and downed cyber infrastructure could result in the loss of life in the case of hospitals, traffic control and food safety and can result in significant financial damage as economies are pushed into a downward spiral. The concept of the grey zone warfare encompasses the C5 continuum in many different forms of activity, from relatively common, day-to-day forms of covert action or mis-information dissemination to military actions that push the boundaries of conventional conflict. Many of these activities cannot be deterred and India must undertake a campaign of response actions designed to either dissuade or to neutralize the effect of such grey zone aggression, primarily develop resilience and robust defensive architecture. Requirement for deterrence is for high end grey zone aggression e.g., shows of force, military coercion, sabotage and denial of service attacks (DoSA). These are the forms of grey zone aggression that might be subject to deterrence. Just because deterrence is more challenging in the grey zone does not mean it has no value. Policy makers and military practitioners need to be cognizant of the challenges of grey zone deterrence and how to shift their strategic approaches. Clear postulation of defined red lines for acts of aggression, particularly in the case of cyberspace and triggers for escalation of force for non-military attacks can aid in grey zone deterrence. In the case of conventional grey zone aggression, rapid response forces are one of the best hard power deterrents India could invest in. In the case of China’s actions in Doklam and Galwan where military force was used rapid deployment of troops did raise the stakes and took China by surprise. Similarly had NATO or Ukraine responded to Russians in Crimea it would have raised the stakes for Russia’s actions and it may have not been able to cross the line from grey zone to hybrid warfare as easily as it did. When it comes to cyber-attacks, retaliatory cyber-attacks or even the use of the military when a line is crossed could be effective as displayed by India with use of conventional force against a sub-conventional target during air strikes at Balakot in 2019. The military calculus of Grey Zone Warfare as developed by Rand Corporation and interpreted to Indian situation is as under:-
5. This three-category matrix allows distinction to be made between resilience, dissuasion and deterrence. Day to day grey zone activities in competition and crisis domain are moderate and persistent. The distinction in response is that India must develop competencies and have resilience to compete with persistent activities, which are generally legitimate, very gradual and with limited provocative value. On the other hand, India must attempt to dissuade many moderate grey zone activities with robust defensive architecture, raising the cost of these more coercive and pointed actions and thus reducing their perceived value and deterrence strategies developed for aggressive, high-end activities. The ambiguity of Grey Zone Warfare is most pronounced during various forms of cyber aggression that could be located in any of the three categories of the typology. A massive, society-crippling attack on governmental institutions and critical infrastructure would be a severe, high end form of grey zone aggression while day-to-day harassment below the level of major attack is in the persistent domain. The link between cyber security and conventional military responses is poorly defined, which presents a window of ambiguity and opportunity for attackers. Furthermore, the secrecy of offensive cyber capabilities undermines their deterrent value, as conventional deterrence partially relies on a show of strength and strategic communication so the enemy can understand the potential consequences for their actions. Dissuasion however, seems to be the more apt response to grey
zone actions in cyber domain. The first part of this is through enhanced investment and training in cyber-security to mitigate vulnerability to attacks. The second part of dissuasion is resilience; resilience of cyber infrastructure as well as societal resilience. Datum line for such resilience is as under: -
(a) Assured continuity of government and critical government services.
(b) Resilient energy supplies.
(c) Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people.
(d) Resilient food and water resources.
(e) Disaster response capability.
(f) Resilient civil communications systems.
(g) Robust civil transportation systems.
6. Weaponization of information to achieve competitive advantage, ranging from propaganda to mis-information to large-scale disinformation campaigns designed to influence the outcomes of elections and other major activities can also fit into various components of the framework. Pakistan’s attempts to malign the electoral process in 2019 represent moderate grey zone competition that India must dissuade prior to 2024 elections. Day-today social media activities and trolling are a classic form of persistent gray zone competition. Other information-based tactics, such as more-pointed disinformation and narrative engineering campaigns aimed to damage the targeted society, could fit into the moderate category but these are not something India is likely to have great success in deterring; the effort to manipulate narratives is an assumed part of power rivalries and seldom justifies credible threats of punitive retaliation.
7. When we examine the deterrence challenges of grey zone, many aspects of those challenges will simply not be subject to deterrence by military means, hence the focus must remain on high-end gray zone activities. High-end activities as actions that retain the basic grey zone character of remaining below thresholds for major response and pursuing political gain gradually over time but that represent the most belligerent activities on the grey zone spectrum, involving the direct coercive use of military or non-military capabilities and sometimes involving violence. In this category is use of proxies (JeM, HM & PAFF)[9] or militia paramilitary units (or so-called civilian paramilitary maritime/land capabilities) to coerce, intimidate or stake a claim to territory; hostile actions against the civilian or military assets of a country, such as ramming ships or engaging in dangerously provocative air operations; or destructive cyber-attacks. These actions, which are usually attributable, fall just below the outright military aggression practiced by Pakistan since 1947, which can be classified as interstate aggression that emerged out of a longer-term grey zone effort. The theory of deterrence in grey zone emerges from the relationship between perceived costs and benefits of aggression in the mind of a potential aggressor. A potential attack that appears to have very substantial benefits and very low costs and risks will be tempting. One with enormous likely costs and risks and marginal benefits will be less attractive. The challenge for effective deterrence in grey zone comes from the skewed perceptions that states bring to such calculations. Deterrence can fail, when a potential aggressor convinces itself that costs will be low even though objective analysis would suggest otherwise. In general, however, deterrence policies have their effect by raising the costs and risks involved in aggression and reducing its perceived value[10]. India can shape the perceived value of aggression both with dissuasion and with deterrence. Strategies of dissuasion such as confidence-building measures and reassurances can be fruitful rather than showing persistent belligerence. India can forestall aggression by keeping such moments from arising, partly by offering timely assurances through both verbal statements and policy positions to reduce a potential aggressor’s fears. Three broad factors that help determine whether deterrence is successful are as follows: -
(a) Motivations of the potential aggressor, including its perceived need to act, the degree of interests it has at stake and its subjective perceptions of cost versus benefit analysis of a potential attack.
(b) Deterring state’s clarity of message about what it aims to deter and what it will do if that commitment is challenged
(c)The aggressor’s belief that the defender has both the capability and the will, thus, the credibility of message to fulfill its threats and commitments.
8. The variables mentioned above guide the basic responses of grey zone deterrence which are challenged by multiple factors, namely, actions fall below the threshold of military response and unfold in an expanded temporal window with inbuilt plausible deniability. For actions that are attributable, grey zone aggressors will offer extensive legal and political justifications, often grounded in historical claims supported
with documentation and steer clear of the defender’s existential interests. Grey zone campaigns are typically built around nonmilitary tools but backed with all vectors of CNP that are designed to attack particular vulnerabilities in the targeted country. The vulnerabilities can include social cleavages, such as ethnic populations sympathetic to aggressor, political polarization and economic stagnation. It leads to resultant grievances and lack of military or paramilitary capabilities. Apropos the deterrence of grey zone activities is aimed at analyzing the following criterion[11]:-
9. Indian Armed Forces’ capabilities for grey zone are not only a matter of
employing existing capabilities in a focused way. Not all grey zone challenges can be viewed as implied tasks of major combat operations. The requirement for deterring in the grey zone demands some degree of priority emphasis, in capability development, force design, posture and technology investments. The Army is rightly focused on being ready for major combat operations; however, on a day-to-day basis, the capabilities that will be in the highest demand are those for the ongoing competition
below the threshold of war. That alludes to a necessary balance in the emphasis put on major conflict and grey zone capabilities. In an era of rising inter-state interactions in the C5 continuum, India’s putative adversaries are increasingly looking to campaigns of grey zone actions to achieve an overwhelming advantage. This attempt to set criteria that can gauge the strength of deterrent relationships in this continuum allows Indian Armed Forces to succeed in this realm, they will have to take grey zone aggression seriously as a distinct area of strategy and create concepts, capabilities and technologies for the purpose of deterrence unique to this domain of warfare.
[1] Claudio Cioffi Revilla, Origins and Age of Deterrence: Comparative Research on Old World and New World Systems. https://journal.agepub.com/doi/10.1177/106939719903300302 accessed on 28 May 23.
[2] https://www.goodreads.com/work/quotes/18524498-the-dark-world-1 accessed on 01 Jun 23.
[3] Some of the official and unofficial statements on gray zone activities in the past few years include International Security Advisory Board, Report on Gray Zone Conflict, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 03 Jan 2017; Nathan P. Freier, Outplayed: Regaining Initiative in the Gray Zone, Carlisle, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Jun 2016; and Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, Carlisle, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 2015.
[4] Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,” Prism, Vol. 7, №4, November 2018, pg 31.
[5]Tim Starks, Russian Sandworm hackers deployed malware in Ukraine and Poland, 11 Nov 22 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/11russian-sandworm-hackers-deployed-malware-ukraine-poland/
[6] Hannah Hollander, What is Grey Zone Deterrence, Network for Strategic Analysis, Robert Sutherland Hall, Suite 403, Queen’s University info@ras-nsa.ca.
[7] Dr Srini Sitaraman, China’s Salami Slicing Tactics and the Latest India-China Border Stand Off. https://dkiapcss.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/N2502_sitaraman_salami_slicing_china.pdf
[8] Michael J. Mazarr, Joe Cheravitch, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, What Deters And Why, Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Grey Zone Aggression, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, USA, pg 25.
[9] https://www.news18.com/news/india/pak-terror-handlers-using-proxy-outfits-for-targeted-killings-in-kashmir-heres-their-destructive-plot-5329981.html accessed on 01 Jun 23
[10] Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980.
[11] Michael J. Mazarr, Joe Cheravitch, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, What Deters And Why, Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Grey Zone Aggression, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, USA, pg 36.
