DEFINITION OF WAR TODAY

For Indian strategy theorists, scholars and students, the watershed moment in pursuit of understanding conflict in the modern era and evolve from conventional Industrial Age wars was Operation VIJAY in 1999. Since then, a debate has raged as to whether the nature of war in the sub-continent has changed and, if so, what that means. Concepts such as “hybrid” and ‘fifth generation” war have entered the lexicon, suggesting that there is an important, perhaps profound, distinction between the wars we fought since independence and those of the present and future. Some analysts even suggest that the concept of war itself is obsolete. For such radicals, militaries and defense establishments must undertake revolutionary transformation to adjust to contemporary war. Traditionalists, by contrast, focus on continuity. They conform to the Clausewitzean dictum that while the character of war has changed, its essential nature persists. Strategy should not, for the traditionalists, succumb to whimsical trends. This debate has profound implications for strategy, force development and leader development. For the Indian Armed Forces to prepare for future security challenges, its military and civilian leaders must grapple with the changing meaning of war.

The Clausewitzean construct defines war as organized violence to achieve political ends. This divorces war from ethical or normative structures. Carl von Clausewitz and his modern followers’ devoted little attention to the question of whether war in general or a specific war was legal or ethical. The goal was an amoral, even scientific approach. Character of war had been far different in the 18th century. The dominant image in Indian sub-continent was war with occupying forces be it the French or British, war involved conventional armies fighting battles in line and column. But in reality, sieges were far more numerous than battles, while “small wars” with use of guerrilla and partisan forces were common be it Maharaja Ranjit Singh or the First War of Independence. In fact, every epoch witnesses this mix. Often a single war combined the forms. While warfare took different operational forms, Europeans in India preferred or felt most comfortable with war with states led by legitimate kings and nawabs.

Since independence the heroics of Col Tarapore at the helm of Poona Horse in battle or Field Marshall Manekshaw leading India to victory in 1971 is what we wanted war to look like. This contrasted with a picture of a soldier in a Kashmiri home carrying out search while a clearly terrified woman and her son crouch nearby or to the most recent battle with stones and clubs at Galwan River with PLA. These to most Indians, is ignominious war. Young officers and soldiers did not enlist for it, and the common Indian has difficulty understanding it. We still yearn for conventional maneuver warfare with its power, clarity, and glory, the strategic articulation of Cold Start Doctrine and Proactive Strategy in the recent past is a clear indication of the same. In defining war for the 21st century, we must be able to face reality in our own cultural expectations of war. It brings out a new nuance of war; it has other functions than simply the pursuit or protection of national interests through the use of force. If it did not, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate and preferred or un-preferred war would not matter. That it does matter shows that war plays other psychological, cultural, and political roles beyond the pursuit of national interests.

Defining war is vitally important for the military profession, but it is important to move beyond the study of battles and campaigns to understand the political, socio-cultural, techno-economic, and geo-dimensional elements of armed conflict. Hybridization and perpetuity of war are the most important ongoing change in the character of war1.This blends conventional warfare with organized crime, irregular conflict and terrorism. Clausewitzean notion of war today too holds good and is comprehensive and flexible enough to explain contemporary and future forms without the need for wholesale redefinition. Clausewitz’s definition, which was developed in stages through his work rather than in one passage, views war as the composite of hostility, chance and purpose. It is not subject solely to the laws of logical necessity, but also to the laws of probability and to the constraints of policy or more importantly to internal politics. This implies the need to use ways and means appropriate to the desired end.

The conundrum that most strategic and operational commanders and political leaders are grappling with today even during the current stand off with PLA in Eastern Ladakh is; “Are we at War?” In past, this question would have struck strategists and political leaders as absurd. The inception of a war was clear; it began when political leaders declared that it had, or through a stunning surprise conventional attack like that by the Pakistan Air Force in 1971. Militaries would then mobilized and expand. This often required the instigation of or expansion of conscription. In an era of total war, the economy also went on a war footing. This would almost certainly include increased production of weapons and war material, but also increased taxation and government borrowing. And there was a general change in political discourse and public attitudes — partisanship normally declined while demonstrations of patriotism expanded. Today this has changed, the opening salvoes of 21st century war may not be a conventional attack, but a range of other hostile actions designed to weaken a state. It may take the form of a cyber attack(s) from unidentified sources, engineered economic crises, or even a pandemic as its panning out to be in the present context. Thus, the argument goes, a nation may be at war without knowing it and sometimes without knowing precisely who the enemy is.

War, in earlier times was very distinct from “not war or peace” at multiple levels, many inextricably connected to the identity of the nation which undertakes it. It is a national “time out,” when all else is put aside or becomes less important than prosecution of the war. This is a vital point: War is not only a method by which one state imposes its will on another, but also a vital component of creating a nation and driving its evolution. Participation in war changes a nation just as profoundly as it changes an individual. Dharm Yudh or jus ad bellum, played a major role in the development or evolution of national identity; involved a great goal or mission, universal sacrifice of some sort from the citizenry of the nation at war, and a great enemy. Triumph moved the national narrative ahead: India as a nation victorious in a just war changed and was different than it used to be in significant ways. However recent conflicts have failed to generate the required congruity and dissonance within the state have persisted be it surgical strikes in 2016 where in evidence was demanded from political parties to Operation ZAFRAN wherein while the Indian Army moved forward to adopt an offensive precautionary disposition, the BSF retracted from the International Border for election duties. India now has three choices in its conflict with its putative adversaries i.e. Pakistan and China; it could move it below the threshold of “at war.” It could redesign a national narrative into a transformative mission not driven by war. Or it could carry on with the dissonance between the national narrative and national actions and hope for the best. This surely is a recipe for disaster with a divided and irresolute nation.

We are discussing war or conflict today because our armed forces are engaged with an enemy utilizing violence. The dimensions of war or conflict today with China and Pakistan have changed as it becomes increasingly difficult to segregate the military and nonmilitary domain. Contemporary conflicts require a much more integrated use of the elements of comprehensive national power. They also tend to drag longer than previous wars, involve more collateral damage, and entail rapid adaptation on the part of the combatants. War, in other words for us has become persistent and pervasive. The nation and we in the Armed Forces are still adjusting to this as we are still bound with the romantic idea of hoisting the tricolor on the objective and then going home as the politicians take over the post conflict activities. Historically, wars end in one of three ways. There may be a negotiated settlement which signals to military forces, the public in participant nations, and other states that the war is over. One side may be victorious and imposes the terms of the settlement, or it may reflect a compromise giving both sides some of what they wanted. Although, it is now less common, wars may end through the annihilation of one side or the other. The third option is for a war to simply peter out without any formal recognition that it has ended. This is most common in wars involving a non-state combatant or a state of armed conflict where war was never declared. The losing side simply blends back and conforms to international norms or accepts the status quo tacitly. Often the end of a war comes not when a fielded military is defeated, but when the political leadership of one side accepts that it has been defeated. Because the stakes are often higher internally it may be possible, perhaps even easy, to attain a military outcome, but difficult to convince domestic audience of the outcome of a conflict and thus reach a sustainable conclusion. The result is likely to be periods of conflict interspersed with truces rather than true peace; a classic example we have witnessed on our Northern Borders since 1962 and suffering the consequences of it in 2020.

1 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid vs. Compound War,” Armed Forces Journal International, October 2009.