COGNITIVE DOMINANCE AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL
1. Etymology of military lexicon is no more a study in the past but as much a study of the present. Words and phrases coined very recently procreate with rapidity to provide new challenges of grasping the nuances and conceptual expanse of the offspring. Evolutionary cycle of such phrases also is linked to geography, Unrestricted Warfare[1] in China is Ambiguous Warfare[2] in Russia and Hybrid Warfare[3] in the West. In India, the armed forces were just about coming to terms with the conceptual construct of one such terminology; Information Warfare (IW). Indian Army Doctrine published in 2004, hypothesized IW as “IW can be defined as actions taken to achieve ‘information superiority by adversely affecting the adversary’s information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks whilst simultaneously protecting one’s own information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks’.”[4] Another domain gained traction in spectrum of conflict ie cognitive domain and from there rose the idea of Cognitive Dominance. Cognitive Dominance would be a higher order effect and would encompass all of the human mind, its actions and inactions.
2. Cognitive Dominance converts the human mind into a battle space and seizes control of the same. The aim is to change not only what people think, but how they think and act. Executed successfully, it shapes and influences individual and group beliefs and behaviours to favour an aggressor’s tactical or strategic objectives across all domains. In its extreme form, it has the potential to fracture and fragment an entire society, so that it no longer has the collective will to resist an adversary’s intentions. An opponent could conceivably subdue a society without resorting to outright force or coercion. The aims of cognitive dominance are strategic, with campaigns launched over the course of decades. A single campaign could focus on the limited aim of preventing a military manoeuver from taking place as planned, or to force the alteration of a specific public policy. Several successive campaigns could be launched with the long-term objective of disrupting entire societies or alliances, by seeding doubts about governance, subverting democratic processes, triggering civil disturbances or instigating separatist movements.
3. A capability based approach to develop Cognitive Dominance demands following capabilities and capacities be attributed at operational /tactical level to a formation. The capabilities that need to be harnessed, optimized and generated are as under: -
Core Capability Development
4. Military Deception. Operational level of war is concerned with creating the conditions which will support the best use of available resources in the attainment of the strategic objectives. Deception should focus on causing the adversary commander to incorrectly estimate the situation in the operational area with respect to own force disposition, capability, vulnerability and intentions. Deception at the operational level should link the strategic level deception planning to the tactical level actions. Intelligence and counter intelligence operations are critical, specifically in identifying adversary decision-makers, their perceptions and adversary information gathering capability; in providing estimates of adversary actions under differing scenarios; in establishing and monitoring feedback channels; and penetrating adversary security measures and deception.
5. Psychological Operations. Psychological Operations at operational level can include the distribution of leaflets, radio and TV broadcasts, loudspeaker broadcasts and other means of transmitting information including social media that encourages enemy forces to defect, desert, flee or surrender. Psychological Operations coalesced with kinetic operations persistently can have a synergistic effect accelerating degradation of morale of en forces and further encouraging psychological dislocation.
6. Information Security. Information Security is a process which consists of five distinct actions: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerability, assessment of risk and application of appropriate mitigation measures. The ultimate threat to information security is the adversary commander. The intent of information security as a part of cognitive dominance should be to force the adversary commander to make ineffective decisions based upon insufficient info and/or to delay the decision making process due to missing information. Denial of critical information contributes to uncertainty and slows the adversary’s OODA cycle.
7. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW waged throughout the Electro Magnetic spectrum with the objective of securing and maintaining effective control and use of the spectrum by own forces and denying its use by an adversary through damage, destruction, disruption and deception. The concept of cognitive EW is not new, but advances in machine learning offer a renewed opportunity to adapt to a highly contested spectrum. Everything from cosmic radiation to smartphones modify a unique EMS environment. Cognitive EW aims to sense, characterize, and exploit the EMS by teaming exquisite sensors and machine learning toolkits. Using cognitive EW tools, warfighters would be able to observe the EMS threat, orient for the spectrum, employ multi-domain combined arms, and rapidly consolidate gains.
8. Cyber Operations. Cyber Network Attacks (CNA) can be very effective at the operational level depending on the tech sophistication of the adversary. On the other hand, Computer Network Defense (CND) becomes critical when own forces rely heavily on information technology and information systems. CNA may target both defense and civilian systems due to shared infrastructure, an attack for one may cause the other one also to be affected (collateral damage). Cognitive cyber-attacks can be overt or covert. No attempt is made to conceal overt cognitive attacks, for example website defacements. Provision of misinformation, the intentional distribution or insertion of false or misleading information intended to influence reader’s decisions and / or activities, is covert cognitive hacking. The Internet’s open nature makes it an ideal arena for dissemination of misinformation. Cognitive hacking differs from social engineering, which, in the computer domain, involves a hacker’s psychological tricking of legitimate computer system users to gain information, like passwords, in order to launch an autonomous attack on the system.
Support & Ancillary Capability Development
9. Media Engagement.
(a) Social Media. Cognitive abilities have been weakened by social media and smart devices. Social media use can enhance the cognitive biases and innate decision errors described in the Nobel-prize winning behaviourist Daniel Kahneman’s book Thinking, Fast and Slow. News feeds and search engines that serve results which align with our preferences increasing confirmation bias, whereby we interpret new information to confirm our preconceived beliefs. The rapid pace of messaging and news releases, and the perceived need to quickly react to them, encourages “thinking fast” (reflexively and emotionally) as opposed to “thinking slow” (rationally and judiciously).
(b) Conventional Media. Until a few decades ago, conventional news media — Newspapers, Magazines, Radio and Television — were the major channels of information dissemination and mass-mediated messages, with trained professional journalists serving exclusively as disseminators of news and information. This exclusivity enjoyed by the mainstream media and professional journalists, however, came to a halt with the arrival new media technologies. However, the ability to engage with conventional media at operational level is predicated on development of competencies in respect of media capacity and capability. Skills like public speaking, epistolary skills and body language need to be developed. Paucity of PROs demand that personnel capable of engaging with conventional media be empowered.
10. Kinetic Operations. Creation of content for cognitive dominance during prosecution of kinetic operations will be a challenge and may lead to dilution towards the main effort. Ipso facto, development of content is to be on the GO and hence the requirement of equipping ground troops with ‘Go Pro’ cameras in order to create the content, dash board mounted cameras on vehicles and even armoured vehicles have immense potential in synch with ‘Eyes in the Skies’ by use of RPAs and Drones. It is therefore recommended that procurement of such equipment be expedited. Videos of ‘jus in bello’ by own forces would provide much needed fillip to the narrative.
11. Cultural Awareness. Cultural awareness can reduce battle space friction and the fog of war. It can also improve the capability of troops to accomplish their mission by providing insight into the intent state and non-state actors in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA), thereby allowing us to get inside an adversary’s decision cycle and out maneuver him. Similarly, an understanding of culture and society is also critical in stabilization and consolidation operations which may require an extended committal of troops post cessation of hostilities. It enables troops to better understand those unique factors of history, religion, geography, ethnicity and sectarianism and the local economy that shape an indigenous population. As military commander it’s necessary that such education become part of the PME construct for officer corps and junior leaders to start with.
13. Civil Military Affairs (CMA). CMA activities help commanders establish and maintain relationships between their forces, the civilian authority and general population, resources and institutions in hostile territory where the forces are employed. CMA may take place during, subsequent to, or in the absence of other military operations. CMA activities strengthen the capability of a force in ‘just post bellum’, effectively applying its indigenous resources to mitigate or resolve instability. The objective while focusing on immediate or near-term issues should be HEAL (Health, Electricity, Ameneties and Law & Order), operational commanders are responsible for allocating and distributing resources that enable tactical leaders to execute CMA. Education and empowerment in this field is negligible and must become a KRA for development of offr corps in future.
Conclusion
14. Cognitive capability influences all aspects of soldier performance — physical, mental, and emotional. Despite its desire to achieve cognitive dominance for multi-domain operations (MDO), the Army has yet to fully develop and adopt the concepts of cognitive performance enhancement and optimization. Instead, soldiers serve in an “always on” culture of instantaneous communication, attempting to filter dozens of information streams and make rapid decisions while operating on too little sleep and without the benefit of cognitive performance education and training. As the Indian Army transitions to being Future Ready, it prescribes even more complex tactics using increasingly sophisticated equipment, the Army must change its approach to cognitive performance to prevent adversaries from gaining the asymmetric advantage that they seek in the cognitive domain.
15. Operational level cognitive dominance picks up where the strategic level has left off. While strategic efforts still continue, operational level cognitive dominance deals with employment of information vectors in a battle space to obtain an advantage over the adversary. The start of the operational level of cognitive dominance usually means that the strategic efforts to protect peace have failed. The focus of operational level cognitive dominance then, becomes creating advantageous conditions for military operations and bringing quick end to the hostilities. Since this is the level which ties the tactical actions to the strategic objectives, a great deal of attention must be paid to the efforts at this level. Cognitive dominance at operational level, especially, can have effects at all three levels simultaneously. These efforts will pave the way to more successful tactical actions and a quicker and smoother attainment of strategic objectives.
[1] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999.
[2] Valery Gerasimov,“The Value of Science in Prediction.” Russian Academy of Military Science’s Military-Industrial Courier, Feb 2013.
[3] Fridman Ofer, The Conceptual Foundations of ‘Hybrid Warfare ’’Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence & Politicization (2018;Oxford Academic, 21 Feb19), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190877378.003.0002, accessed 23 Sept. 2022.
[4] Headquarters ARTRAC, Indian Army Doctrine promulgated on 22 Oct 2004, pg 19, para 2.14.
[5] https://www.armyrecognition.com/chinese_china_army_wheeled_armoured_vehicle_uk/psyops_wheeled_armoured_vehicle_zfb05_technical_data_sheet_information_description_intelligence_uk.html accessed on 13 Oct 22.
[6] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/Through-the-lens.pdf accessed on 13 Oct 22
