CITIZEN SOLDIERS IN MODERN CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT
Introduction
1. In Indian context war fighting has always been a whole of nation approach, be it the ‘Vanar Sena which built the bridge to Ravana’s Lanka or the Kevat who ferried Lord Rama across the river’ to use of citizen soldiers by Chatrapati Shivaji against the Mughals and even the first war of Independence was fuelled by participation of the local population which rose up in arms to restore the status quo and oust the English infidels. The raison-de-etre for picking up arms or supporting the military may have been varied and contextual but the fact remains that Indian citizenry has risen to the occasion, however the occasion had to appeal to it. On the flip side, one quite common characteristic of Indian armies and citizens was their inability or lack of desire to engage invading armies as resistance fighters[1] or undertake guerrilla tactics.
2. Ancient China in the warring states period featured the mass-mobilization of thousands of peasant soldiers who fought for years at a time, leading to enormous social disruption and famines. Yet, for better or worse, in India, local populations did not fight to the death and warfare remained the province of military elites. If these were defeated, kingdoms would often fall into enemy hands, as the entire Ganges Valley did after the defeat of a coalition of Indian princes by the Ghurid Empire in 1192. Even military elites rarely fought to the bitter end, preferring to make accommodations with their enemies. This was the case for most of the Rajput states during the Mughal period. A part of the problem stemmed from the lack of centralized command and unity of purpose in Indians. If the main commanders were defeated or killed, the component parts of the army often quickly fell apart, even if victory was still possible. A stark example is at the Battle of Talikota in 1565, when the Vijayanagara Empire was defeated by a coalition of sultans. Although the city of Vijayanagar was not actually captured, and would have been difficult to do so, the various nobles of the empire simply fled back to their fiefs and abandoned the capital. Sieges were where local militaries had the greatest advantage, including the defense of a high ground, but as the Mughals learned in Rajasthan, terms were often most preferable to local rulers than mass starvation and defeat. However, when armies did engage in protracted tactics, as the Marathas did against the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb for over two decades, there was success to be had. In modern era the Geneva Convention made very clear distinction between the hostiles and civilians and the rules which governed them during conflict or was to be considered jus-in-bello[2].
Evolution of Concept
3. Lenin’s papers, Partisanskaya Voina (Partisan Warfare), published on 13 October 1906 in his newspaper Proletari, insights into preceding ‘armed struggle’ activities are described in the context of weakening the state. ‘Armed struggle’ was differentiated from ‘armed uprising’. Lenin evolved this doctrine into two key contributions to Marxist theories of revolutionary war against capitalism. The first was to conceive a ‘vanguard party’, composed of intellectual elites, which would set the conditions for and lead the revolution. When the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917, the Communists duly took the van, ruthlessly seized the existing power centres in the cities and then prevailed in the resultant civil war. The second contribution was the notion of a ‘popular front’ — a pragmatic coalition with other opponents of the capitalist regime. A popular front was about alliances and co-opting interests: ‘integrating “little wars” of the partisans with “big wars” of the regulars’. The organisation created to fight capitalism worldwide, the Communist International (Comintern), operated as a ‘long arm’ of the Kremlin[3]. Initially its focus was defensive as it infiltrated the White Russian émigré circles of Europe to discredit, dis-inform and disrupt remaining resistance to Bolshevik rule. The extension of these policies is what is visible today in Ukraine, where Gen Gerasimov has implemented his doctrine of ‘Ambiguous Warfare’ by ‘Little Green Men’ which is being countered in the same coin by the Ukrainians.
4. German operational art evolved during the interwar period embraced unconventional approaches. During the Spanish Civil War assault on Madrid by four army columns, the concept of ‘fifth columnists’, working within the city, entered the military vernacular. The idea of such psychological disruption by unconventional forces was seemingly well incorporated into German operational concepts and was refined during military exercises with the Soviets over the 1930s. William Donovan, head of America’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS), quoted Hitler describing these lessons; ‘We need armies. But we shall not use them as in 1914. The place of artillery will in future be taken by revolutionary propaganda, to break down the enemy psychologically before the armies begin to function at all, mental confusion, indecisiveness, panic, these are our weapons.’[4] These concepts were then expertly employed to seize Austria and the Sudetenland without fighting, and then integrated with Blitzkrieg in Poland, Norway, Belgium and France in a manner that resonates with today’s view of ‘hybrid warfare’.
Modern Conflicts
5. In the last few decades there has been a growing reluctance by India to put “boots on the ground for full scale conventional conflict”. Large scale ground force operations have been replaced by what is now “war by remote control”, involving the use of stand-off weapons (Balakot Air Strikes), special forces (Surgical Strikes), local militias (Baluch Liberation Army) and Private Military Companies (PMCs) which have not found foot hold in the Indian dialectic on war fighting. In modern conflict, the outsourcing of war fighting can be made at four levels, Vladimir Rauta has produced a typology of armed non-state actors classifying these groups into four categories, “proxy” “auxiliary”, “surrogate” and “affiliated” forces.[5] These forces can be used in the contact kinetic, non contact kinetic and non contact kinetic domains of the conflict spectrum. However in the Indian context, it may be pertinent to see such a citizen force as a militia available during conventional conflict to augment own forces and initiate actions or deter enemy from taking actions which would enable accomplishment of desired end state by own forces. The manifestation by such forces can be in two forms which are discussed in succeeding paras.
6. Private Military Companies (PMC) as an enterprise organised along corporate lines that is formally contracted to provide military services has not found traction yet. However, globally, most private companies that work with the armed forces restrict their activities to training and support functions, but a true PMC delivers direct combat services. The media and some lawyers routinely refer to these PMCs as “mercenaries”, although the legal status of private companies, as opposed to individuals who take part in foreign wars, remains ambiguous. All major powers now employ private contractors to provide critical combat support and combat service support to state military forces. PMCs also perform peacekeeping tasks for the UN and non-governmental organisations. However, India has neither acknowledged combat support functions nor accepted direct combat operations as a legitimate role for PMCs. However, this concept is here to stay and it is better that we absorb this into our war fighting doctrine from inception stage.
7. Citizen Militia (CM) is another vector available to the conventional forces in the entire spectrum of conflict; Indian armed forces have dabbled with Ikhwanis in Kashmir[6]. Such proxy forces create both benefits and risks for the state. They can reduce the political and financial costs of a war, especially in circumstances where there is a risk of wider conflict and limited public support for direct military involvement. These forces can partner the regular forces providing operational, technical and logistic support, while regular forces take lead in combat operations, they can provide valuable local tactical, cultural and linguistic knowledge that deployed soldiers usually lack. A classic case in point is Shri Ranu Lal who still lives in the village of Myajlar was in 1965 a young teenager who provided guidance and intelligence to 1 GARH RIF (now 6 MECH INF) in launching a successful counter attack against Pakistani Rangers who had occupied the village of Myajlar[7]; his village. As in the above mentioned case, they can prove to be motivated and determined fighters with a real stake in the outcome of the conflict. However, as public opinion has arguably become the centre of gravity for many states in contemporary warfare, governments have had to become more conscious of accountability, cost and casualties. War fighting by such militia while cheaper will attract domestic and international political and public scrutiny.
Effect of Employment of Citizen Militia (CM)
8. CMs would become organized armed groups that are aligned with the government at the national or sub-national level but not identified as members of the conventional armed force. The paper doesn’t cover actions by civilian in combat support and logistic support role which is more or less a given in a whole of nation approach. Most studies on the effects of such CMs focus on the relationship between them and human rights violations. Irrespective of their informal/semi-official distinction, it does not help account for how differences in a variety of factors; such as the recruitment base and mode of operation can impact conflict processes. Examination of a broader range of factors, such as their relationship with adversaries’ populace, religious and ethnic affinity will enable a deeper understanding of the effects of militias on war fighting. The membership composition and operational parameters of militias often differ little from those of state forces as they may comprise of off-duty military or police, which should offer a distinct advantage for gaining intelligence and providing valuable tactical inputs.
9. This would comprise of ex-service men, retired police persons and members of CAPF and in future ‘tour of duty[8]’ repatriates with a level of military training, civilian defense forces recruit civilian groups from within areas contested by the adversary forces. Secondly, CM remains within their recruitment areas. Unlike mobile fighting forces that cross from one area to the next, they are static. Along with their civilian status, this means that CM members typically live in their own homes rather than reporting to a barracks. Thirdly, CM performs “defensive” tasks. They undertake intelligence, security and limited combat roles concerned with the protection of their local areas from insurgents. They extirpate 4GWs including SSG and LCB troops from their own communities and deny access to them from the outside. CMs are differentiated from militias that actively target a variety of opponents across wide areas. We also differentiate them from groups who perform other roles within their local community that are not connected to a conflict. In sum, CM harnesses the active participation of civilians in sedentary, defensive roles. CM defends their community from the adversary.
10. However, the presence of CM in battle space can also polarize adversary’s forces. This may lead to higher levels of violence as regular forces and 4GWs will seek to gain the active, rather than passive control of the area. Civilians become participants in the conflict and thereby blur the lines of Geneva Convention. They actively support and collaborate with conventional forces and are thus viable targets. The presence of a CM will refocus the targets of conventional forces and 4GW violence and increase incentives to target civilians which may be counterproductive in the cognitive domain. However, the same can be used as a narrative to malign the image of the adversary as a force which is not following Geneva Convention and indulging in human right violations which may precipitate a ground swell of international responses and effects thereof on its war waging potential.
Strategy Formulation
11. The convergence of regular forces with CMs creates a picture that is of a cumulative strategy, and it is this, in contrast to Western sequential strategies akin to deep battle. The converged forces operate and deter grey zone activities as part of echeloned offensives in battle spaces that are peripheral or perceived to be of limited value by rival forces This description is that of a cumulative strategy, in which the decisive effect is the tipping point that is generally not foreseeable or predictable. Autocratic actors like CMs will be employing cumulative strategies that have a basis in classic Maoist strategy and might be rationalised to today’s context as follows:
(a) Phase-1. The establishment of front organisations for CMs is typical of traditional Maoist warfare’s subversive phase. In the Information Age, a greater number of tools are now available with which to undermine an adversary and to establish clandestine networks. This would be a defensive manoeuvre aimed at strengthening the defensive fabric and releasing regular forces for offensive trans-frontier tasks.
(b) Phase-2. Progression to an offensive phase for employment of CMs would be aimed at sabotage and militia actions, gradually building mass that reinforces the regular forces and their Lines of Efforts (LoE). Such actions are exemplified today by Russia’s ‘Little Green Men’, China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ and Iran’s Quds Force sponsored Fatima Division and Zenab Brigade.
© Phase-3. It is only when an adversary is weakened, fractured and distracted by subversive and proxy actions that conventional military forces pursue destruction and decimation objectives or fait accompli seizures of objectives, before employing rapid de-escalatory tactics.
12. The error lies in confusing the ways and the means. The means of asserting control over a population has changed over the past century, transitioning information effects from newspaper-based propaganda to radio, to television and now to internet-based social media. The ways remains the same.
Conclusion
13. CMs can be understood as a prerequisite for any form of armed force in a cumulative strategy. Upon successful attainment of political infiltration and subversion of the target, irregular actors are then employed in what has been termed grey zone warfare. The use of the term ‘grey zone’ to describe operations prior to hostilities or during it tends to obscure rather than enlighten when not anchored in a hundred years of evolved theory, as presented in this paper. Strategists must not confuse with unnecessary terminology. We must recognise that the mechanism of creating advantage (i.e. the mechanism of CMs) remains the same; it is the means that evolve (e.g. from newspaper articles to social media posts). The lessons that will enhance the Indian Armed Forces ability to counter grey zone threats lie in history. We might therefore do well to pick up the dusty books of history from Kautilya to Mahabharat.
[1] The resistance movement, Europe’s secret armies or partisans, gathered intelligence for the Allies, destroyed communication lines, assisted escaped POW’s and openly attacked the Germans once the retreats on both the western and eastern fronts had started. https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/resistance-movements/ accessed on 10 May 22.
[2] International humanitarian law, or jus in bello, is the law that governs the way in which warfare is conducted. IHL is purely humanitarian, seeking to limit the suffering caused. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello accessed on 10 May 22.
[3] Walter D Jacobs, 1962, ‘Irregular Warfare and the Soviets,’ in Franklin Mark Osanka (ed), Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961 (New York, NY: Free Press Ltd), pg 63.
[4] Col. William Donovan and Edgar Mowrer, 1941, Fifth Column Lessons for America (Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs),pg 6.
[5] Rauta, Vladimir. (2019). Towards a typology of non-state actors in ‘hybrid warfare’: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces. Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 33. 1–20. 10.1080/09557571.2019.1656600.
[6]Ikhwan force; the state-backed controversial counter-insurgency militia that played a crucial role in breaking the backbone of Kashmir militancy at its peak in the 1990s. https://theprint.in/india/lost-generation-of-kashmirs-ikhwanis-looks-at-politics-to-revive-relevance-in-new-jk/348649/ accessed on 10 May 22.
[7]https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/features/brave-garhwalis-seized-gadra-city-129582 accessed on 10 May 22.
[8] https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/tour-of-duty-announcement-to-take-more-time-sub-committees-set-up-7907156/ accessed on 10 May 22.
