BRIDGING THE PERSIAN GULF: WORK IN PROGRESS

1. Issue Brief No 188 published by CLAWS in August 2019[1] was my exposition on how Pakistan was trying to sail in two boats charting divergent courses in the Persian Gulf, ie Saudi Arabia and Iran. The sectarian divide between Shia and Sunni sects of Islam were exacerbated in 1979 when the Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran and a theocracy was born which aimed to spread its brand of Islam at all costs and at most times at the peril of powerful dispensations in Gulf States which till then had been able to forge an uneasy but calm societal construct in their kingdoms and nation states as the case was. Watershed events like the siege on US Embassy in Tehran, the Iran –Iraq war and projection of Quds Force across the Persian Gulf had calcified the fault lines and the chances that a bridge would be able to cover the Persian Gulf ever was tottering on the cusp of an impossibility. But like the famous Bond movie title ‘Never Say Never Again’; what seemed impossible a few years back has now started to gain shape of a remote possibility if not a certainty. While the world was gasping and expressing its anguish on the US sell out in Afghanistan and contours of a new Great Game took shape in Afghanistan, another development was occurring in the neighborhood, talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran under the tutelage of the most unlikely go-between Iraq. The famous adage of international relations, ‘there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests’ attributed to Lord Palmerston (John Henry Temple)[2] has come true yet again.

2. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both grappling with internal dissension and external farrago of geo-politics queered by arrival of Israel at their doorstep which has started to forge diplomatic and trade relations with Gulf States. The region astride the Persian Gulf has been beset with widespread upheaval including the Arab Spring and the Colour Revolutions in the near past and the competition between rival coalitions seeking to expand their sphere of influence and determine outcomes in weak and fractured states in the region, be it Yemen or Iraq. The accord signed by UAE and Israel in 2020[3] breached the proverbial red line between the Arab world and Israel where in the Palestine issue was a non-negotiable. On the other side economic health of these states plummeted for divergent reasons but the bulging petro-dollar purses started to shrink, and there is no better strategic glue than money which can create many a strange bedfellows. The arrival of the Biden administration and its distinctly divergent policy on Iran from that of Trump coaxed Saudis to recalibrate and change their recalcitrant posture on Iran which under the new dispensation has shown more malleability and amenability to diplomatic overtures. The realization on both nations that confrontation is not an option in the present geo-political construct and may be its better to negotiate and contain rather than confront and create a crisis.

3. The siege of Mecca in late 1979[4], was the last straw which broke the camel’s back and brought to fore the belligerence of theocratic Iran and also the transition of Saudi Arabia from a passive custodian of Islam’s holiest sites to a zealous missionary of Salafism the most intolerant strain of Sunni Islam. The rift while in the political domain found expression in the ethnic and sectarian domains. The intransigent views across the Gulf saw each other trying to gnaw at the social fabric of their opposing states and allies and use of non-state proxies to create civil rife within the countries. Diminished by forty years of isolation and sanctions by the US led Western World has weakened Iran’s position if not its resolve to be a regional powerhouse. Iran has tried to convert its non-state allies to a notion of ‘vilayet-e-fakih[5]’ but failed. Saudi Arabia post the arrival of US forces during Op DESERT STORM has been viewed by most other states as a US proxy and protectorate which is fronting the Zionist agenda in the region.

4. US capacities to project power have ebbed and flowed as political dispensations have changed at Capitol Hill, but its enmity to Iran has endured. Despite this true to American culture the response of US governments to Saudi Arabia — Iran conflict has not been consistent forcing both nations to look beyond USA. Crown Prince MBS has not found favour at Biden’s White House[6] and also reluctance of US to be drawn into regional conflicts like the one in Yemen has forces Saudi Arabia to patch itself to the nuclear deal negotiations Iran is having with P5+1[7]. The proliferation of violence from Yemen to Riyadh and its effect on the economic health has also forced Saudi Arabia to realize that the best bet lies in making peace with Iran to extricate itself from the economic and security cesspool its drowning in. What does Iran hope to gain from this new found warmth is primarily a fillip to the nuclear deal negotiations and with resolution of Yemen display its credibility as a responsible nation state within the comity of nations.

5. Four rounds of talks between the two states hosted by Iraq in last six months[8] itself is an achievement of sorts, even if the expectations are low the basic premise that they have not broken down is a cause for celebration. While Saudi Foreign Minister has described them as ‘exploratory’ and while the Iraqis have shown exuberance that the a deal is round the corner, one must always keep in mind that IRGC sans Gen Sulemani still holds considerable clout in the decision making calculus of Iran and has the capability to upset the apple cart at a time of their choosing by actions precipitated by their prodigies. However, the recent talks has involved the Quds Forces representatives as well providing it more legitimacy than before. The Iranian acceptance to these diplomatic overtures is being driven by the log jam in the nuclear negotiations which after six rounds have yet to gain positive forward traction. It seems that these two deals have an intractable linkage at some level and the leverages on one can affect the other.

6. Iran while progressing the talks with Saudi Arabia has an agenda in Iraq too and these talks must seem to succeed as this would provide credibility to the Iraqi political dispensation and continue to maintain its strangle hold on Iraqi institutions and militia. The Iraqi PM is also wanting to remove Iraq as the new battle ground for regional power politicking and offer its services as a conjugal go between for warring parties. The result of these talks would mean a lot to Iraq as well whose internal fault lines have offered Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and US to run riot with machinations not aligned with its own national interests.

7. The Ebrahim Raisi government also needs to quell the dissent growing within Iran too as they hope to project an image of a government capable of resolving problems through diplomacy and reverse the dire economic situation that prevails within, due to the isolation[9]. The return of Taliban on its eastern borders has created fresh challenges for Iran. Iran has given a very cautious welcome to Taliban government in Kabul. While Iran sees the capitulation of US to a small ideologically driven militia a confirmation of its investment in the ‘Axis of Resistance’[10]. While sectarian divide between Shia Iran and Sunni Taliban cannot be over emphasized and in past the Taliban has acted murderously against the Shia population in Afghanistan which could have precipitated a war in 1998 when Taliban murdered Iranian diplomats[11]. The strong anti-Shia ideology of Taliban and the presence of ISIS will finally create a chasm and put Iran between the Devil and the Deep Sea with two sectarian rivalries on both the borders; much of a binary stretch. Iran is likey to face a serious threat on its eastern front if Taliban fails to consolidate and Afghan soil is used by IS and Al Qaeda to launch attacks into Iran.

8. Another joker in the pack is Pakistan whose position as the main mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been usurped by Iraq and Imran Khan is still smarting from this diplomatic coup of sorts. Imran Khan’s refusal to send troops to Yemen was a major stumbling block in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and also the creation of a new Ummah with Turkey has distanced Pakistan from the Gulf States. While Pakistan was as per my hypothesis was sailing in two boats of Iran and Saudi Arabia, it has decided to express its gymnastic skills by boarding another boat named Turkey and this was written about in my article titled, ‘Leadership of Ummah: Choices for Pakistan’ published by CLAWS in September 2020[12]. Since Turkey and Pakistan now cohabit the Grey List of FATF[13] and have drawn closer, it seems unlikely that Pakistan is going to play any further role as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

9. While there is a glimmer of hope at the horizon that a fault line forged in Karbala in 680AD[14] may be bridged and the confidence of Islam would offer a degree of stability to the region and concomitantly create stability in peripheral regions of middle east which includes the Indian sub-continent too as the Islamic fault lines have traction within India and also in the neighborhood. The proof of the pudding is in eating it; there is a certain degree of pragmatism which needs to be added to this dialogue with conflicts in Middle East have a propensity to flare up by Black Swan events precipitated by a lone wolf if not by a motely pack of ideologically driven terrorists.

[1] https://www.claws.in/publication/pakistan-and-middle-east-an-unholy-embrace accessed on 17 Oct 2021.

[2] Artemio V Panganiban, No Permanent Friends or Enemies, www.opinion.inquirer.net published in 2017. Accessed on 20 Oct 21.

[3] Colin Chapman, Israel and the United Arab Emirates Strike an Historic Peace Agreement, internationalaffairs,org.au dt 25 Dec 2020. Accessed on 17 Oct 21.

[4] Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising at Islam’s Holiest Shrine, Anchor Publishers, Reprint Edition 09 Sep 2008, pg34. Accessed on 14 Oct 21.

[5] Kasra Arabi, What is Velayat-e Faqih? Tony Blair Institute of Global Change, posted on 20 Mar 2019. https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih accessed on 21 Oct 2021.

[6] Nic Robertson, What’s Behind Biden’s snub of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, posted on 18 Feb 2021. https://www.cnn,com/2021/02/17/middleeast/saudi-biden-mbs-robertson-intl/index.html accessed on 13 Oct 21.

[7] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance accessed on 21 Oct 2021.

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-confirms-first-round-talks-with-new-iranian-government-2021-10-03 accessed on 20 Oct 2021.

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-58109087 accessed on 21 Oct 2021.

[10] Payam Mohseni,Hussein Kalout, Iran’s Axis of Resistance Rises: How It’s Forging a New Middle East posted on 24 Jan 2017. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/iran-axis-resistance-rises-how-itsforging-new-middle-east accessed on 20 Oct 2021.

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/11/world/iran-holds-taliban-responsible-for-9-diplomats-death.html accessed on 15 Oct 2021.

[12] https://claws.in/leadership-of-ummah-choices-for-pakistan accessed on 10 Oct 2021.

[13] https://m-economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/turkey-joins-pakistan-in-fatf-grey-list-in-a-double-blow-for-islamabad/articleshow/87196574.cms accessed on 21 Oct 2021.

[14] https://www.hyperhistory.com/online_n2/people_n2/ppersons4_n2/karbala.html accessed on 20 Oct 2021.