BALUCH AND PASHTUN UNITY
1. X (erstwhile Twitter) threw up two interesting and unconnected pieces of information, but to the discerning eye that is watching Pakistan, it may be the beginning of a new ethnic alignment that may upset the balance of power within ethnic groups of Pakistan. The census of 2017 places the Punjabis at the top of the food chain both in terms of numbers and heft they yield within the nation, while the Sindhis and Pashtuns are the other two ethnicities which are at 14.1% and 15.4% respectively[1]. The diverse ethnic makeup has often led to competition, conflict, and tensions between these groups, contributing to the complexity of Pakistan’s identity landscape. The Punjabis if are the Bat Man the Pashtuns are the Robin, the loyal sidekick kick and this amalgam has ensured the societal construct remains stable and aligned with the needs of the Punjabi elite. The same analogy also applies to the Armed Forces of Pakistan where the Punjabis and Pashtuns have ruled the roost. Pakistan’s present crisis is a dynamic and multifaceted challenge deeply rooted in the interplay of ethnicity, religion, nationalism, language, and history but the recent coming together of ethnic groups against the Punjabi hegemony and the discord between Pashtuns and Punjabis has frayed the societal fabric. Going back to the two news items on X, they are:-
Pashtun support to the protest march that had begun after a Baloch youth was allegedly killed in custody by the CTD a few days back is part of a movement against the decade-long enforced disappearances and murders of innocent citizens in Balochistan. This cause is also very identical to that of PTM which has also sought return of illegally detained Pashtuns during CT operations by Pakistan security forces in FATA and KPK. The protest march had begun after a Baloch youth was allegedly killed in custody by the CTD and is like the Pashtun Long March in 2019[2]. The solidarity between the ethnic groups could and should be a sign of hope and a source of strength for all of them. Currently, this solidarity is based on the humanitarian issue of missing persons, however, for it to be of any consequence, there has to be clarity about the cooperation and it has to take a political form as well in the upcoming elections. Only unity on a political basis will be of any help to those affected since otherwise this will remain no more than social cooperation and may peter out over time.
The Baloch will find it easy to support the Pashtuns in their demands for the return of the internally displaced persons (IDPs), the end of collective punishments, the end of checkpoints in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), an end to the security forces’ highhandedness, and an end to the deportation of Pashtuns across the Durand Line. The Pashtuns, for their part, will have to support the Baloch in their struggle for rights over their resources and coast (i.e. the Gwadar Sea Port) as well as their politics for securing Balochistan’s interests in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is interesting that previously the PTM was not considered to be anti-state and it was called a struggle for constitutionalism and fundamental rights, while in contrast the Baloch struggle has always been considered as being anti-state and foreign-funded. Now the same fate has befallen the PTM and it is likewise labelled anti-state and foreign-funded. This is a good enough reason for Pashtuns to join hands with the Baloch people.
Pashtun and Baloch movements have metamorphosed with stimuli from the domestic environment and external political actors. CPEC has focussed on the natural resources of Baluchistan, the development projects have had no impact on the alleviation of the challenges of local populace including poverty as they are not in receipt of the direct benefits of such developments. The plutocracy of landlords and sardars has created a chasm between the Baluch elite and the middle class, driven by the legacy of past generations has aligned itself to the Baloch nationalist movement. They are demanding their rights and claiming their stakes on the economic development of their province. In the case of the Pashtuns, the PTM has become an unprecedented national movement. The leaders of PTM initially focussed on the issue of indiscriminate mining of the region and illegal detention of civilian population by Pak security forces with their tag line of “Yeah jo dehshatgardi hai iske piche vardi hai”[3] creating a headache for Pakistan Army of immense proportions. As the Pakistan military sought to bring down the PTM, there have been numerous reports of human rights violations being committed against the Pashtuns with the PTM leader Manzoor Pashteen languishing in jails quite often[4]. The movement is not militant and represents the Pashtuns’ fight for their constitutional rights with not separatist agenda. The fact that the PTM is non-violent, is in stark contrast to the number of Baloch rebellions that have advocated violence against state instruments. While Pashtuns and Baloch have had a similar history and experience with regards to atrocities committed against them by the state, their movements have taken different paths. However, this clubbing may lead to the PTM also being branded in the same colour of violence and anti-nationalism by Pakistan state.
Pakistan has faced intense polarization since its last elected prime minister, Imran Khan a Pashtun(Pathan), was ousted from power in 2022 after falling out with the country’s military. His removal spurred mass protests which culminated on 09 May 23 with the attack on Pak military establishments particularly after he was arrested on charges of fraud a year later. The spurt of attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and concentrated targeting of Pakistan security forces has further antagonized the Punjabis who are the bedrock of Pakistan’s military and the refusal of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to reign in TTP has exacerbated the divide. The decision to deport Pashtuns has further divided the two major ethnic groups and calcified their stances. Pakistan on 03 Oct 23 ordered all illegal immigrants, including 1.73 million Afghan nationals, to leave the country or face expulsion after revealing that 14 of 24 suicide bombings in the country this year were carried out by Afghan nationals[5].
The killings of Punjabis in FATA (fig-2) is a first of its nature retribution against Punjabis in Pashtun dominant areas and if this trend line continues a cycle of violence accentuated by retributive killings in Punjab and KPK doesn’t auger well for the homogeneity of Pakistan as a state. If sub-nationalism of these ethnic groups gets harnessed against the Punjabi majority a new dynamic would be on the cards where in Pashtun, Baluch and Sindhis would combine their effort against the Punjabis. Bilawal Bhutto has already thrown his hat in the ring as a potential prime ministerial candidate and if the Sharifs are to be seen as the face of Punjabi majoritarianism and Bhutto, the counterbalance the Pakistan Democratic Movement’s days are numbered.
On the international front, the antagonism could spill across the Durand Line and further worsen Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, which has already condemned the deportation policy. The financial strain of hundreds of thousands of returnees could complicate aid efforts, given the ongoing Western sanctions on the Taliban government. Islamabad’s plan to counter terrorist attacks by deporting migrants could backfire by fuelling grievances and decreasing Kabul’s willingness to cooperate. The cooperation between Sindhi, Baluch separatist groups and TTP would stretch the endurance of Pak security forces and this cooperation is visible by the ease with which Majeed Brigade of Baluch is operating in Karachi and KPK. The TTPs of these terrorist groups have started to mirror each other with Tehreek-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) recent attacks on Mianwali Air Base and attack on the security post in Dera Ismail Khan’s Daraban area bordering the South Waziristan where 23 soldiers lost their life alludes to an escalation of violence along the restive Durand Line and Gold Smith Line. Fig-3 below shows the casualties Security Forces have suffered over the last three years in Baluchistan and KPK. A retaliation by Security Forces against the Pashtuns and Baluch might see retributive killings transcend against civilians which may push Pakistan further into the abyss of civil unrest and chaos.
[1] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/10/21/from-the-two-nation-theory-to-regional-autonomy-movements-pakistans-identity-crisis/ accessed on 03 Jan 24.
[2] https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/03/22/on-the-question-of-baloch-pashtun-unity-over-the-dilemma-of-missing-persons-in-pakistan/ accessed on 02 Jan 24
[3] https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/pashtuns-stage-anti-pakistan-protest-outside-unhrc201809192345060001/ accessed on 02 Jan 24
[4] https://www.dawn.com/news/1536600 accessed on 02 Jan 24.
[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-orders-all-illegal-immigrants-leave-after-suicide-bombings-2023-10-03/ accessed on 03 Jan 24.
