RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM UKRAINIAN CONFLICT
1. Romans had organized their forces into Legions as a basic unit to conduct combat operations; however the origin of the Divisions can be attributed to French General Maurice de Saxe, Marshal General of France, in his book Mes Rêveries . The combat capability of the Division and its advantage were optimized during Napoleonic Wars under Jomini’s tutelage. It made the armies more flexible and easy to maneuver, and it also made the large army of the revolution manageable. The defeat of Prussians in 1805 put a stamp of approval on the organizational construct and was adopted world over. The Division concept survived the travails of WW-I and WW-II; the doctrinal evolution triggered by technology be it the rail road and telegraph in WW-I or air power and mechanized forces in WW-II. Divisions of US Army operated with aplomb in Op DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM and so did the Israeli Divisions and the Russian Divisions in Lebanon and Chechnya respectively. “Don’t fix, which isn’t broken” is an oft repeated idiom and prima facie seems to be the case here too. Nevertheless restructuring of forces is a facet of RMA that has most armies besotted; be it the NATO block countries or the ideological counter weights China and Russia. The Russian Army had jumped on to the bandwagon of making Brigades out of the Division size forces in 2004–05 but under the present pol-mil dispensation had done a volte face and become more circumspect over this issue.